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Fannie Mae is "the world's largest floating crap game."
-- Oakley Hunter'
I. Introduction
The bank and thrift problems of the 1980s may represent only the
tip of the iceberg of the government bailout of financial institutions. As
of 1991, over one trillion dollars in debt had been issued by quasi-public
corporations known as government-sponsored enterprises (enterprises).2
These part-private, part-public institutions are indispensable components
of the nation's economy and are "too big to fail."'3 Several of the enter-
prises are among the largest financial institutions in the United States.
Most notably, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
ranks as the sixth-largest corporation in the nation.4 The enterprises are
1. Oakley Hunter, Former Chairman and President, Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation, quoted in Curtis W. Tuck, The Secondary Mortgage Market, in THE STORY OF HOUSING
399, 419 (Gertrude S. Fish ed., 1979).
2. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS 2 (1991) [hereinafter
GAO, A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS]. The debt
of government-sponsored enterprises and the contingent liability of the federal government are
excluded from the federal budget. From 1987 to 1989, these enterprises borrowed more money
to service their debt than the federal government did to service its own. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT SPON-
SORED ENTERPRISES 2 (1990) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
3. "Too big to fail" describes the federal government's voluntary commitment to keep
troubled institutions operating-a commitment undertaken because their failure would have a
far worse effect on the economy than would the cost of rescuing them. See Cheryl D. Block,
Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 968-72 (1992).
4. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: PROFILES OF GOVERN-
MENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 47 (1991) [hereinafter GAO, PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES]. The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), also an
enterprise, ranks among the nation's 100 largest public corporations and 20 largest nonbank
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privately owned corporations chartered by Congress to further public
policy goals. Congress created each enterprise to benefit the public by
serving as a financial intermediary for particular sectors of the economy
that were inadequately served by the private capital markets. Through
secondary markets, the enterprises buy and sell mortgages and student
loans, thereby enhancing the availability of reliable credit to farmers,
homeowners, colleges, and educators. 5 Because of the enterprises' size
and important contributions to society, the federal government would
not permit any of them to fail. The havoc such a failure would wreak on
the nation's economy would be more costly than a government bailout.
Since Congress created the first of these quasi-governmental corpo-
rations over sixty years ago,6 the relationship between the enterprises'
private owners and the public sector has lacked clear definition. 7 As fed-
eral "instrumentalities" created to fulfill a governmental purpose by way
of normal profit-making activities associated with private industry, the
enterprises remain subject to some federal laws, while enjoying exemp-
tion from others." Their size and their importance to the national econ-
omy compound the basic question plaguing any quasi-governmental
entity: What is the government's responsibility for these enterprises?9
Uncertainty about the scope of the government's role in supervising, con-
trolling, and managing these enterprises extends from the halls of Con-
gress to Wall Street. It largely derives from the erroneous perception
financial institutions; it has provided over $40 billion in funds and commitments for educa-
tional loans. IdL
5. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:
THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS 2 (1990) [hereinafter GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S
EXPOSURE TO RISKS]. The enterprises match the centralized supply of investment capital with
the decentralized demand for that capital. The size of the enterprises' secondary mortgage
market is second only to the market for United States Treasury securities. GAO, PROFILES OF
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 26.
6. Congress created some of the enterprises to remedy the effects of the Great Depres-
sion. See infra Part II.B.
7. See Richard W. Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 55 (1971) (discussing Fannie Mae's "split personality"); Comment, FNMA and the
Rights of Private Investors: Her Heart Still Belongs to Daddy, 59 GEo. L.J. 369, 370 (1970)
(focusing on conflict between public corporate policy and the private rights of shareholders).
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. Questions surrounding the dual personality of these federal instrumentalities have
existed since the first national bank was created in 1791. In 1824, for example, during oral
argument in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, counsel asked the Supreme Court: "Can an
institution, then purely private, and which disclaims public character, be clothed with the
power and rights of the government ... ?" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 781-82 (1824) (argument
of petitioner's counsel); see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING 22 (1992).
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pervading the financial markets that enterprise debt is backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States government.10
Like the enterprises, nationally chartered banks and thrifts consti-
tute privately owned federal instrumentalities.1  An inevitable conflict
between private ownership and government interests arose during the
banking and thrift crisis of the 1980s. Concerned that the enterprises
showed many of the same symptoms as the troubled thrift industry,1 2
Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) to bolster regulatory
supervision of three of the largest enterprises.1 3 Although no enterprise
was in jeopardy of immediate failure, Congress recognized that the enter-
prises, like private financial institutions, face the possibility of failure.1 4
As we have learned from the bank and thrift failures, the tension
between private and public interests inherent in federal instrumentalities
becomes more intense if the entity becomes financially troubled.15  In
case of failure, the Safety and Soundness Act empowers federal regula-
tors to appoint a conservator for the financially troubled enterprise.1 6
The appointment of a conservator, however, causes the private- and pub-
lic-sector interests to become adversarial. The federal government's reso-
lution of the bank and thrift failures provides a relevant parallel, and
demonstrates how the murky standard of corporate responsibility inade-
10. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The enterprises receive virtually no gov-
emnment appropriations; they derive their financing from the issuance of short- and long-term
debt. Because the enterprises have significant ties with the federal government, and because
their debt obligations are issued in the same manner as United States Treasury debts (which
are federally guaranteed), the public perception is that the federal government guarantees the
enterprises' debts as well. Id.
11. See infra text accompanying note 115.
12. GAO, A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS,
supra note 2, at 2. The thrift industry debacle prompted Congress to pass the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 1404, 103 Stat. 183, 551.
13. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1301, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4619
(Supp. IV 1992)) (covering Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks).
Congress modeled the 1992 Safety and Soundness Act after the savings and loan bailout legis-
lation that dramatically increased the government's regulatory powers. Cf. FIRREA. Similar
legislation is pending for the other major enterprises. See S. 1915, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(Sallie Mae); H.R. 3083, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Sallie Mae); H.R. 3298, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (Farm Credit System); H.R. 3300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Farmer Mac).
14. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 5, at 2. The enter-
prises are subject to the same risks as other private financial companies-fluctuating market
interest rates, loan defaults, and other credit problems; improper management decisions; and
external business factors such as natural disasters, industry competition, and changes in tech-
nology, demography, or legislation. Id. at 31.
15. See MALLOY, supra note 9, at 717-809.
16. See Safety and Soundness Act § 4620.
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quately defines the interaction of these competing interests. In the 1980s,
zealous federal regulators viewed private parties as the culprits responsi-
ble for the massive losses of the banking and thrift industry.17 Conse-
quently, the regulators grossly disregarded any competing private
interests.
Despite vehement challenges by the private sector, most courts fol-
lowed the regulators' lead by upholding the government's interest, to the
apparent exclusion of the interests of shareholders, creditors, and bor-
rowers. From the ruins of the banking and thrift industries, a new stan-
dard of corporate responsibility for federal instrumentalities emerged
under which government interests superseded all others. The intrinsic
flaw in this new standard lies in its disregard for the vital role played by
the private sector. Congress created federal instrumentalities to fulfill
public policy goals through the private sector's efficient profit-making in-
centives. The government should supervise the enterprises to protect
against abuses of this privilege by the private sector, but should not disre-
gard private-sector interests in times of trouble.
This Article argues that a new standard of corporate responsibility
must be developed for federal instrumentalities-a standard that bal-
ances the interests of the public and private sectors. Neither the tradi-
tional corporate concepts of shareholder wealth maximization, nor the
federal supremacy standard works well for these quasi-public corpora-
tions. Rather, a standard that focuses on the best interests of the enter-
prise would best sustain and balance the competing public and private
interests. It is naive to believe that an-enterprise's government-appointed
conservator would weigh private parties' interests fairly in the midst of a
government-assisted financial rescue. Therefore, private parties should
insist that Congress provide a structure that would balance all relevant
interests in the reorganization of an enterprise. Although the Safety and
Soundness Act allows for the appointment of a conservator for a troubled
enterprise,' it does not adequately address the priorities of the private
and public interests in such a reorganization. By addressing these issues
prospectively rather than retroactively, as was the case with the savings
and loan crisis, 19 the private sector might be able to work better with
Congress to allocate such risk properly.
17. See Major Causes of the Thrift Crisis, H.R. REP. No. 101-54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 294 (1989).
18. See Safety and-Soundness Act, § 4620.
19. One of the reasons Congress passed FIRREA in 1989 was the recognition that federal
law concerning the appointmentof a conservator or receiver of a federally insured depository
institution required sweeping changes. See infra notes 225-234 and accompanying text.
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Collectively the enterprises have assumed almost one trillion dollars
of debt. Prudence demands that creditors fully anticipate and prepare
for the debtors' insolvency. 20 The enterprises' private-sector creditors
should consider and redefine their rights before an enterprise becomes
insolvent. A balanced reorganization plan could provide a framework to
protect the public and private interests at stake, not only in the ordinary
course of business, but through financial crises as well. The costly les-
sons of the banking and thrift debacle illustrate the inadequacy of Con-
gress's previous approach to resolving crises in federal instrumentalities,
and mandate a new solution for government-sponsored enterprises-a
solution that equitably balances private and public interests.
Enterprises rank among the largest financial institutions in America,
but because they conduct their business in the secondary markets, the
general public lacks direct awareness of their operation.21 In an effort to
dispel the aura of mystery surrounding them, this Article explains the
nature of the enterprises and their role in the secondary markets. This
Article discusses controversies between public- and private-sector inter-
ests in federal instrumentalities, and examines the traditional standard of
corporate responsibility and the new standard emerging from the bank-
ing and thrift crisis. It then considers the application of these standards
to an enterprise, to private reorganization, and to future government
assistance. Finally, this Article proposes strategies to fairly balance the
competing private and public interests in the enterprises.
Part II profiles the nature and history of the enterprises and their
role in the financial markets. An explanation of the secondary markets
illustrates how the enterprises developed private capital markets, thereby
using private investment to promote public policy. Part III discusses the
private corporate standards and public agency responsibilities. Since
banks, thrifts, and the enterprises are considered "federal instrumentali-
ties," this Part introduces the law on that subject. Part III then explains
the twin catalysts propelling the enterprises toward problems similar to
those seen in the banking and thrift crisis: the implicit government guar-
antee and the government's "too big to fail" policy. Part IV introduces
the legislative response, the Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, in which
20. See DON CAMPBELL ET AL., CREDITORS' RIGHTS HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE
DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP 7 (2d ed. 1992).
21. The secondary market is the fastest growing segment of the U.S. capital markets, and
one of the least understood sectors of the economy. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Sallie Mae, and
Farmer Mac are restricted by law to the secondary market. See THOMAS H. STANTON, A
STATE OF RISK: WILL GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES BE THE NEXT FINANCIAL
CRISIS 15 (1991). For an overview, see THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (Jess Leder-
man ed., 1987).
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Congress chose to translate the experience of the failed banks and thrifts
to the context of the enterprises. The new grant of power allowing an
agency to appoint a conservator for a financially troubled enterprise par-
allels the government's response to the banking and thrift crisis. Part V
discusses the government's role as conservator of failed financial institu-
tions and examines the case law that changes the rights and responsibili-
ties of the private interests. This Part focuses on attempts by
shareholders, creditors, and borrowers to challenge government actions.
It discusses the resulting standard of corporate responsibility and illus-
trates the deficiencies in such an approach. Part VI distinguishes banks
and thrifts from the enterprises and explains why the continued opera-
tion of the enterprises is essential to the nation.22 Significant differences
between the banks and the enterprises, however, mandate a different so-
lution. Accordingly, this final Part proposes a strategy which would re-
organize a financially troubled enterprise to equitably balance
government and private interests and ensure the continued operation of
the enterprise. This Article concludes that Congress should prospec-
tively provide a forum for consideration of private parties' interests in the
event of an enterprise's insolvency. Consideration of private interests
would ensure the continued successful existence of the enterprise and the
public-private partnership it represents.
II. Government-Sponsored Enterprises
A. The Secondary Markets
The federal government has used enterprises to promote and facili-
tate public policy goals for over eighty-five years. 23 These enterprises
support the government's policy objectives by creating secondary mar-
kets that facilitate the flow of credit to home buyers, farmers, students,
and colleges. Secondary markets integrate primary lending markets with
the capital markets. 24 In the primary market, lenders deal directly with
22. The enterprises are financial institutions subject to market forces and are, by defini-
tion, risk-taking entities. The belief that an enterprise may become financially weakened and
require federal assistance is not farfetched. See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO
RisKs, supra note 5, at 2, 31.
23, Since the creation of the first enterprise in 1916, Congress has chartered eleven enter-
prises to finance sectors of society that had not been adequately served by the private credit
markets, including housing, agriculture, and education. Congress is considering the creation
of "Velda Sue," Venture Enhancement and Loan Development Administration for Smaller
Undercapitalized Enterprises, to support loans to small business. Udayan Gupta, Venture
Capitalists Raised 7S% More Money Last Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at B2.
24. The capital markets represent the supply of money, while the lending markets pro-
vide demand for money. See generally, Kenneth J. Thygerson, Federal Government-Related
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borrowers by originating loans for home buyers, farmers, and students.
Prior to the creation of the secondary markets, primary lenders had to
balance their lending practices with the deposits they received.25 This
forced balancing created severe credit shortages during economic down-
turns, when demand for loans increased and the source of primary lend-
ing-savings accounts-was depleted by depositor withdrawals. In
effect, the amount of credit available for new loans dried up. The con-
centration of capital markets in major money centers, such as New York
and Chicago, exacerbated this effect. For example, a student in South
Dakota who was unable to obtain a student loan from local lending insti-
tutions would have had no access to banks in Chicago or New York.
Likewise, an investor in San Francisco having money available for the
extension of credit would have had no access to credit-worthy farmers in
Iowa. Enterprises serve as intermediaries, integrating the supply of
money in the capital markets with the primary lenders' demand for
money, thereby eliminating a substantial barrier to the operation of sup-
ply and demand for lending capital.26
The key to the role of enterprises lies in the "securitization" of pri-
mary loans.27 The enterprises buy loans from primary lenders, pool the
loans into portfolios, and then sell the portfolios (or portions thereof) to
investors and others in the capital markets.28 Securitizing the loans29
makes the asset more marketable and assures the enterprises access to
ready investment markets.30 This secondary market permits primary
lenders to sell their loans, and thereby obtain the cash with which they
Mortgage Purchaser, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE BANKING: A GUIDE TO THE SECON-
DARY MORTGAGE MARKET 57 (James M. Kinney & Richard T. Garrigan eds., 1985).
25. Known as the "credit function," the aggregate amount of loans will be exponentially
higher than the aggregate amount of deposits from which the loan funds are generated. See
MALLOY, supra note 9, at 381.
26. Notes and mortgages are deemed assets of the owner and are bought and sold regu-
larly, as are stocks and bonds. Tuck, supra note 1, at 399.
27. The growth in asset securitization is deemed to be one of the most significant financial
innovations of the last twenty years. See, e.g., JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO,
SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988). No
specific legal meaning exists for "securitization," and the term is often used to mean a variety
of things. Broadly, securitization is the transformation of illiquid assets, such as mortgages,
into tradeable securities with a secondary market. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta,
Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1373-
75 (1991).
28. The enterprises finance the purchase of the portfolio loans by issuing short-term debt.
See Thygerson, supra note 24, at 58.
29. A mortgage-backed security is a certificate, secured by a pool of mortgages, which
entitles the certificate owner to payments from cash flow generated by the mortgages. Shenker
& Colletta, supra note 27, at 1383-88.
30. Id. at 1374-75.
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may make new loans. In this manner, the secondary market provides a
constant source of funds for loans and stabilizes the availability of loans
to targeted groups of borrowers such as farmers, students, and home
buyers.
The secondary markets have achieved success by reducing the eco-
nomic risk of loss in owning mortgages and other loans.31 Rather than
forcing primary lenders or individual investors to assume all risk,32 the
secondary markets have reduced aggregate risk by spreading the risks
among the investors through pooling mortgages and selling ownership
interests in the pool. 33 This reallocation of risks has expanded the availa-
bility of loans to disadvantaged borrowers. 4 Linking the capital markets
to this process has increased the supply of available capital and reduces
the cost of loans through more efficient movement of capital. 35
B. Profile of the Enterprises
Notwithstanding their Congressional charter and unique ties to the
federal government, 36 enterprises are owned mainly by private parties,
who control most of the stock and manage the enterprises within the
broad policy guidelines set by Congress. 37 Eleven enterprises currently
operate in different sectors of the economy-four for agriculture, 38 five
for housing,39 and two for education.4° The following discussion profiles
the largest enterprises.
31. Id at 1375.
32. The risks of owning mortgages include interest rate fluctuations, defaults by borrow-
ers, and prepayment. Residential mortgages are generally long-term loans but allow the bor-
rower to prepay the loan without penalty. When interest rates decline, residential mortgages
are often refinanced and prepaid. The lender then has to invest its principal at lower rates
yielding less on the investment over time. Id at 1393-94.
33. The secondary mortgage market can be compared to the market for common stocks,
which allows a business owner to divest some of the risks and benefits of the business and
permit others to share in the benefits and losses. Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance Risk and Re-
source Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RisK-BEARING 134-35 (Kenneth J. Arrow
ed., 1971).
34. Id
35. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 27, at 1375.
36. See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
37. See generally GAO, A FRAMEWORK FOR LiMING THE GOVERNMENT'S ExPo-
suR To RisKs, supra note 2, at 3.
38. The Banks for Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Banks, the Financial Assistance Corpo-
ration (FAC), and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac).
39. The Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Financing Corpora-
tion (FICO), and the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp).
40. The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) and the College Construction
Loan Insurance Association (Connie Lee).
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Farm Credit System. In 1916, Congress established the first enter-
prise, the Farm Credit System (FCS),41 to provide a dependable source of
agricultural credit at competitive rates.42 The statutory policy objectives
of the FCS include furnishing credit and related services to farmers,
ranchers, and their cooperatives to promote efficient farm operations; en-
couraging borrower participation, control, and ownership of a permanent
system of credit for farmers and ranchers; and improving credit for hous-
ing in rural areas.43 The FCS consists of a nationwide network of lend-
ing institutions within twelve Farm Credit Districts, which provides
services and loans directly to farmers, ranchers and agricultural credit
associations." Created as cooperatives, FCS banks are owned and con-
trolled by the borrowers. 45 Selling system-wide debt securities, rather
than collecting deposits, provides the primary basis of funding.46 The
FCS encountered serious financial problems in the 1980s, due in part to
the agricultural recession.47 In 1987, Congress bailed out the FCS, at a
cost that could ultimately reach five billion dollars. 48
Federal Home Loan Bank System. During the Depression, large-
scale withdrawals of deposits, defaults on mortgage loans, and the conse-
quent cash shortage caused the failure of many thrifts. In response, Con-
gress established the Federal Home Loan Bank System in 193249 as a
centralized credit facility to provide funds to the thrift industry and to
41. The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-158, 39 Stat. 360 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 672 (1988)).
42. The Farm Credit System has expanded over the years to include the Federal Interme-
diate Credit Banks, the Production Credit Associations, and the Banks for Cooperatives. In
1987, the Federal Land Banks and the Intermediate Credit Banks merged to form the Farm
Credit Banks. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 2011 (1987)).
43. Farm Credit Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988).
44. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at D-1.
45. Stanton, supra note 21, at 20.
46. The FCS had almost $57 billion of publicly traded debt as of December 31, 1989. See
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at D-1, D-5.
47. At that time, default rates on farm loans rose and the FCS had high-interest-rate risk
exposure. Having issued high-cost, long-term debt to fund mostly variable-rate loans, the FCS
lost money because it had to continue paying high-cost debt while receiving reduced earnings.
See GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 5, at 37.
48. Id. at 19. In 1987, the FCS was composed of three enterprises: the Federal Land
Banks, the Banks for Cooperatives, and the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks. The FAC was
itself an enterprise, established in 1987 to revive the troubled FCS. The FAC-issued debt
obligations are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. Agricultural
Credit Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2278(b) (1987). In 1988, Congress established Farmer Mac, a pri-
vately owned corporation, to create a secondary market for farm and rural housing loans. 12
U.S.C. § 2279aa-l (1988).
49. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Act of July 22, 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988)).
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bolster the availability and distribution of residential mortgage loans.50
Member savings and loan institutions, which owned the Banks, 51 could
then borrow funds through the Federal Home Loan Bank System to help
control their liquidity.52 The Banks finance their operations through the
proceeds of consolidated debt obligations, 53 interest on advances and
loans, member deposits, and the issuance of Bank capital stock.54
Fannie Mae. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) began in 193855 as an agency of the United States government
charged with providing a secondary market for privately made residen-
tial mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA). 56 This secondary mar-
ket purported to encourage primary lenders to originate FHA/VA loans
and to provide the lenders with funds to make new loans. 57 Through the
1960s, the development of Fannie Mae's secondary market proceeded
slowly and was limited to the federally insured FHA/VA loans.
50. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at A-1. During the Depression, the home
construction and finance industries came to a virtual halt. People could not buy houses or
refinance mortgages because many of the local savings and loans had either failed or were too
illiquid to create new loans. Id. Like the Federal Land Banks, a series of Federal Home Loan
Banks operate in geographical districts to ensure the liquidity of member banks. H.R. 54(I),
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1989).
51. All federal savings associations were required by law to become members of a Bank.
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1467 (1988)). All state-chartered savings associations also had to become
Bank members to qualify for deposit insurance with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1988)). Under FIRREA, commercial banks and credit
unions with at least 10% of their assets in home mortgages are eligible for membership in the
Banks. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 704(a)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 416 (1989).
52. Until 1989, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) also regulated the thrift
industry. FIRREA transferred the FHLBB's regulatory functions to the newly created Office
of Thrift Supervision. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 278 (1989). Additionally,
FIRREA established a new independent agency, the Federal Housing Finance Board, to over-
see the operation of the Federal Home Loan Banks. Id § 403, 103 Stat. at 360-61.
53. As of December 31, 1989, $137 billion in consolidated debt remained outstanding.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at C-3.
54. Id. at C-3 to C-6.
55. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a federal agency, chartered Fannie Mae
(originally the National Mortgage Association of Washington) under the National Housing
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 246. Fanie Mae's charter was later codified in the
Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 302, 68 Stat. 590, 612-13. See Stanton, supra note
21, at 202.
56. Thygerson, supra note 24, at 57.
57. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at A-2. The FHA/VA loans were unique be-
cause they offered a long-term, fully amortizing 30-year mortgage when the private market
traditionally issued short-term loans with steep balloon payments due in three to five years.
Id. at A-I to A-2.
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In 1968, Congress transferred Fannie Mae to private ownership and
management, but maintained its statutory charter and public purpose
guidelines.58 Congress also created a new federal agency, the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), within the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, to finance FHA/VA loans.59
Before 1970, when Congress authorized Fannie Mae to purchase
conventional home mortgages, 60 no organized market for the sale of con-
ventional mortgages existed because of the lack of uniformity in the un-
derwriting and documentation of the conventional mortgages.61 In 1973,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac standardized underwriting requirements
and loan documents for conventional mortgages, thereby facilitating the
substantial increase in the trading of conventional mortgages in the sec-
ondary market.62 During the 1980s, Fannie Mae supplied $450 billion in
mortgage funds. In 1989, it helped to provide housing financing for over
one million families.63
Fannie Mae finances its operations and purchases of mortgages by
issuing general unsecured debt to investors. 64 Fannie Mae pays cash or
issues mortgage-backed securities to the primary lenders in exchange for
the mortgages. 65 Fannie Mae's mortgage-backed securities consist of
trust certificates issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and secured by
pools of mortgages.66 As income-earning assets, these securities entitle
the owner to a portion of the flow of principal and interest payments on
the underlying pool of mortgages. The high liquidity of mortgage-
backed securities allows free transferability and negotiability in the capi-
tal markets.
Freddie Mac. Chartered in 1970 as a part of the Federal Home
Loan Bank System, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) increased the availability of mortgage credit through the
58. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 801-10, 82 Stat.
476, 536-46.
59. Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1988)). The
obligations and securities issued by Ginnie Mae are backed by the full faith and credit of the
U.S. government. Tuck, supra note 1, at 409.
60. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-
51. "Conventional mortgages" refers to loans not insured or guaranteed by the federal
government.
61. Conventional mortgages were considered risky investments. Id.
62. Thygerson, supra note 24, at 58.
63. GAO, PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 20.
64. Fannie Mae reported $116 billion in debt outstanding as of December 31, 1989.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at A-3.
65. Id. at A-5 to A-6.
66. These obligations are not guaranteed by the federal government.
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thrift industry.67 At the time, the thrift industry generated almost two-
thirds of all home mortgages. Demand for home mortgages, however,
far outstripped the volume of savings deposits underlying the loans. 6 As
a result, the inconsistent supply of funds in several regions of the country
caused shortages in the availability of home mortgages.
Through establishing Freddie Mac, Congress intended to create a
secondary market for conventional home mortgage loans to improve the
supply of funds to the thrift industry.69 By the end of 1989, Freddie Mac
had purchased and retained for its portfolio approximately $295 billion
in residential mortgages.70 Freddie Mac finances its mortgage purchases
through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities and, to a lesser ex-
tent, through general unsecured debt.7 1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are similar in the manner in which they conduct business, and they virtu-
ally control the secondary market for conventional residential mortgages
falling within their loan purchase limits.72
Freddie Mac began its existence under the private ownership of the
Federal Home Loan Banks and the thrift industry.73 When the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board dissolved in 1989, Congress modified Freddie
Mac's ownership to permit the free transferability of its stock.74
Sallie Mae. In 1972, Congress created the Student Loan Marketing
Association (Sallie Mae) to provide a secondary market for federally
guaranteed student loans.75 Although the Guaranteed Student Loan
67. Emergency Home Financing Act of 1970, Pub. L. No 91-351, tit. III, 84 Stat. 450,
451; see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at B-1.
68. Id
69. The Emergency Home Financing Act of 1970 also granted Fannie Mae parallel au-
thority to deal in conventional mortgages. Id
70. Id
71. Id at B-4. Freddie Mac had $273 billion in mortgage-backed securities outstanding
as of 1989. Id at B-37.
72. Id at B-1. The Treasury Report found an intense competition between Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac that makes the secondary market more efficient and benefits consumers with
lower mortgage rates. Id, at B-17. In 1984, Congress sought to expand private-sector partici-
pation in secondary markets by passing the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988)).
See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 27, at 1385; Paula C. Murray & Beverly L. Hadaway,
Mortgaged-Backed Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, 11 J. CORP. L.
203, 232-34 (1986); Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting
Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497 (1989) (tracking the circumstances
leading to the adoption of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act and its implica-
tion for regulators and financial institutions).
73. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at B-9.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1989).
75. Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 265 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (1988)).
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Program was established in 1965, the long-term illiquidity of the loans
rendered lenders reluctant to participate in the program.76
In an attempt to translate the success of the secondary market in
residential mortgages to the student loan market, Congress chartered
Sallie Mae to extend funds to educational institutions and other lenders
in order to provide a constant flow of funds to the student loan market. 77
Sallie Mae provides liquidity to primary lenders through the direct
purchase of student loans and through warehousing advances. 78 From
1973 through 1989, Sallie Mae provided over forty billion dollars in
funds and commitments for educational loans.79 Sallie Mae's operating
funds come primarily from the sale of debt securities. 80 Although pri-
vately owned, Sallie Mae ranks among the nation's 100 largest public




Private business corporations are formed pursuant to state law.82 In
a classic model of corporate governance, the Board of Directors, elected
by the shareholders, manages the corporation to maximize the wealth of
the shareholders; the corporation's officers and directors owe their fiduci-
ary duties only to the shareholders.8 3 This traditional model evolved
when individual stockholders participated in the supervision of corporate
76. Id. The guaranteed student loans were long-term, illiquid loans with interest rates
capped at below-market rates. Id.
77. The scope of Sallie Mae's authority has been expanded over the years, enabling it to
include uninsured educational loans in its portfolios, to provide financing to educational insti-
tutions, and to supply advances for funding the student loan operations of state and nonprofit
agencies. Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268, 1290;
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 538, 95 Stat. 357, 457;
Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367.
78. GAO, PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 47.
Warehousing advances are loans made to lenders and secured by insured student loans.
79. Id.
80. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at F-9. As of December 31, 1989, Sallie Mae's
liabilities totaled $34.5 billion. Initially, the Department of Education had authority to guar-
antee Sallie Mae's debt instruments, but this authority expired in 1984. Id.
81. Id.
82. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 25 (3d ed. 1983).
83. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making




management.3 4 In recent decades, stock ownership in large corporations
shifted from individual to institutional investors.8 5 Institutional inves-
tors are more interested in the corporations's overall financial success
than its management.8 6 Because of their large and diverse portfolios, in-
stitutional investors have difficulty following the details of management
or participating actively in the supervision of corporations.
The increasing influence of the institutional investor and the merger
and acquisition phenomenon in the 1980s8 7 are shifting the emphasis of
corporate governance from maximizing shareholder wealth to preserving
the corporation and its community of interests: shareholders, consum-
ers, creditors, and employees. 8 As a result of recent detrimental effects
on the corporate community caused primarily by the mergers and acqui-
sition frenzy, twenty-eight states adopted anti-takeover statutes that re-
ject the shareholder wealth standard by allowing the directors greater
discretion to consider the interests of the entire corporate community
when making business decisions.8 9 One of the most important issues
84. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Govern-
ance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 60 (1992). See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World ed., rev.
ed. 1967) (examining the relation between corporations and property); ALFRED D. CHAN-
DLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1
(1977) (discussing the rise of the modem business and its managers); ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1978) (providing an
overview of the responsibilities and functions of corporate directors).
85. Institutional investors own approximately 50% to 60% of the total value of the stock
of exchange-listed companies. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 84, at 60.
86. Id. at 61.
87. The mergers and acquisitions were often highly leveraged transactions in which the
corporation assumed debt. The creditors, primarily holders of investment-grade bonds in the
public markets, suffered tremendous losses from these transactions. In many leveraged
buyouts, investment-grade debt was converted overnight into junk bonds with immediate mar-
ket loss. John J. Creedon, A Business Lawyer Reminisces, 48 Bus. LAW. 335, 344-47 (1992).
Creedon argues that "a board of directors of large, publicly held corporations had responsibili-
ties beyond the immediate gratification of shareholder wealth." Id. at 346. See generally Para-
mount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (holding no duty of directors
to maximize share value when corporation dissolution is not inevitable); JAMES B. STEWART,
DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (discussing the history of junk bond financing in the 1980s).
88. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 82, at 611; William J. Carney, Does Defining Con-
stituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 385 (1990) (indicating that constituency represen-
tation would not significantly affect corporate behavior); ABA Committee on Corporate Laws,
Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990) [hereinafter
ABA, Other Constituencies] (concluding that other constituencies statutes should not be part
of the Revised Model Business Corporations Act); John V. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover
Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806 (1989)
(discussing current unsettled meaning of "corporation").
89. See Symposium, Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STET-
SON L. REv. 1 (1991). See also ABA, Other Constituencies, supra note 88, at 2261-63.
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emerging in corporate law in the 1990s is whether directors of corpora-
tions owe a duty to shareholders alone or to a broader constituency.
Although the powers of the corporation are defined by state law, private
sector corporations are subject to various federal laws, including securi-
ties, antitrust, environmental protection, taxation, and bankruptcy stat-
utes. These federal statutes incorporate some of the interests of the
broader corporate community. 90
B. Federal Agencies
An administrative agency is a governmental authority, other than a
court or legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties. They
are the government's machinery for carrying out congressional or execu-
tive programs with the force of law.9' The agencies have authority to
operate through adjudicating, rulemaking, investigating, prosecuting,
and negotiating. 92
The instruments that create agencies generally define their principal
powers and duties. Congress confers administrative power to agencies,
granting them discretion in carrying out Congressional goals and stan-
dards.93 Most agency action is informal, grounded in the agency's dis-
cretionary authority.94  The agency, however, must not exercise this
discretionary authority in an arbitrary or capricious manner.95 The
Supreme Court has stated that an agency acts "arbitrarily and capri-
ciously" when it fails to consider relevant factors and there is a clear
90. The securities laws protect the public through registration, disclosure, and antifraud
measures. A corporation may seek protection from its creditors under federal bankruptcy laws
through either liquidation or reorganization. By permitting reorganization, Congress recog-
nized that the assets of a debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than
if "sold for scrap" in liquidation. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203
(1983). The Bankruptcy Code recognizes creditors by giving them a voice in the debtor's
reorganization. Under Chapter 11 reorganization, a committee of unsecured creditors votes
on a plan of reorganization and can be heard on any issue. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW § 9.02(e), at 349-50 (1988).
91. Ronald C. Moe & Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises As Federal
Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability, 49 PuB. AD-
MIN. REV. 321, 324 (1989).
92. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 107-18 (3d ed. 1972).
93. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932)
("[C]ongress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon adminis-
trative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and
regulations.").
94. "A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits of power leave him free
to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction." DAVIS, supra note 92, at 91.
95. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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error in judgment or the absence of any rational connection between the
facts underlying the decision and the action taken.96
The agencies are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,97 its
Freedom of Information requirements, 98 and the rulemaking proce-
dures.99 Claims against the agencies are governed by the Federal Tort
Claim Act, lc and agencies receive all funds from federal appropriations.
C. Federal Instrumentalities
As hybrid governmental entities, enterprises have split personalities,
combining both public and private characteristics. The law has dubbed
these hybrids "federal instrumentalities."' 101 Although privately owned,
enterprises are granted authority by federal charter.
A federal instrumentality is a privately owned institution managed
by private citizens, but supervised by the federal government. Under this
dual authority structure, enterprises carry on profit-making business usu-
ally associated with private industry. However, they exist to fulfill the
specific governmental purpose indicated in their federal charters. 10 2 In
essence, the distinction between an agency and an instrumentality is that
an instrumentality does not itself execute governmental policies, but in-
stead facilitates their execution.
In the early 1800s the Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority
to create private corporations through federal legislation. 10 3 After the
War of 1812 left the nation's commercial and financial sectors in disar-
ray, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States as a cen-
tral bank to stabilize the national economy.104 The Second Bank soon
encountered hostility from state banks. Several states passed legislation
96. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("[Ihe
court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment."); see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 166-68 (1962) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's choice of remedy must be rational).
97. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 1306, 3344, 6362, 7562.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1993).
101. The term "federal instrumentalities" stems from the Supreme Court's reference in
Osborn to "national instruments." Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
763 (1824).
102. A federal charter is analogous to a corporation's articles of incorporation. See gener-
ally Moe & Stanton, supra note 91, at 324.
103. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-24 (1819); Osborn, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 861-64.
104. See MALLOY, supra note 9, at 16.
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hindering its activities. 105 As part of the early controversy over federal-
ism, 10 6 the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland 0 7 and Osborn v.
Bank of the United States'0 8 upheld Congress's constitutional authority
to charter the national bank as necessary and proper to carry out the
fiscal operations of the government. 09 The Supreme Court found that
the constitutional authority of the federal government was delegated by
the people through representation in the Constitutional Convention." 0
This delegated authority consisted of enumerated federal powers which,
although limited, were absolute within their spheres."' The Court rea-
soned that because the Constitution granted Congress authority to enact
"necessary and proper" measures to execute the enumerated powers," 2
Congress had the power to create the Second Bank of the United States,
even though power to do so was not expressly enumerated. 13 Under the
rubric granting Congress the legislative authority to enact measures
105. Id.
106. The 1791 charter of the Bank of the United States, which existed for 20 years, in-
spired the classic federalist debate between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Id at
8-17.
107. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (striking down a state statute taxing the Bank as
unconstitutional).
108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (reaffirming McCulloch).
109. McCulloch at 410-24; Osborn at 861-64.
110. McCulloch at 402-05.
111. Id. at 405. Early cases on federal instrumentalities, such as McCulloch and Osborn,
concerned states' taxation of these entities. The state statutes were deemed unconstitutional
because taxation implied the power to control the federal instrumentality, and hence the fed-
eral government. McCulloch at 425-37. Federal supremacy controls cases in which federal
instrumentalities are granted explicit or incidental powers in conflict with state law. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924). A more difficult question arises in the
context of incidental powers. Absent explicit restrictions in their charters, federal instrumen-
talities exercise incidental powers when "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself." Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 32
(6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)) (test
for state action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); see also Wahba v. New York Univ., 492
F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.)(test for state action), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that national bank travel agency
operation was not within the bank's incidental powers); Greene County Nat'l Farm Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank, 152 F.2d 215, 219 (6th Cir. 1945) (applying liberal construction
to the authority of instrumentality to effectuate the purpose of its charter), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 834 (1946). On the other hand, when a state seeks to impose a condition by legislation-
such as a procedural requirement in the banking industry-the focus shifts from the instru-
mentality to the statute in determining potential conflicts with federal law. See, e.g., Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364, 1368-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding
state statute requiring Fannie Mae to pay interest on tax and insurance escrow accounts).
112. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423-24.
113. Id. at 424-25. The Court found that the Constitution granted this power in the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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"necessary" to the exercise of expressly enumerated powers, the Court
enlarged federal power.
The Supreme Court recognized the benefits of the banks' private na-
ture, stating that the corporate operations
enable the bank to render those services to the nation for which it was
created, and are, therefore ... national instruments. The business of
the bank constitutes its capacity to perform its functions, as a machine
for the money transactions of the government. Its corporate character
is merely an incident, which enables it to transact that business more
beneficially. 114
Although the Court's underlying concern in McCulloch and Osborn
lay in confronting attempts by the States to control the federal govern-
ment, the cases are instructive because they define the legal basis for the
existence of the federal instrumentalities. According to these Supreme
Court cases, banks1 15 and enterprises"16 have been defined as federal
instrumentalities.
The federal instrumentalities are given explicit powers in their fed-
eral charters and incidental powers to carry out the explicit ones.' 1 7 The
chartering statutes, similar to private corporations' articles of incorpora-
tion, define the scope of authority granted to the instrumentalities.""
Enterprises resemble governmental agencies because of their federal
charters, their underlying public policy purposes, the statutory limita-
tions on the scope of their business, and their subjection to regulatory
review. 1 9 Enterprises receive the benefits of some federal laws and are
exempt from others. As instrumentalities of the federal government, en-
114. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 863.
115. See First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. Fel-
lows, 244 U.S. 416, 416 (1917); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1903); Davis v. Elmira
Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
116. See, eg., Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102 (1941); Fed-
eral Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231, reh'g denied, 295 U.S. 769 (1935); Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 211-12 (1920) (Federal Land Banks and Joint
Trust Land Banks); Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir. 1979); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir.
1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 30-33 (6th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 1952)
(Federal Home Loan Bank).
117. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. at 656.
118. Id. As the Court stated in McCulloch, the intent behind the Necessary and Proper
Clause was to give Congress the discretion to legislate those means necessary to exercise its
enumerated powers because a fixed set of powers would soon become outdated. McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420-21.
119. See generally Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of
1992, 12 U.S.C. § 4619 (Supp. IV 1992).
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terprises are exempt from the Bankruptcy Code120 and enjoy immunity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.121 As private corporations, the in-
strumentalities are not subject to federal appointment of senior officers,
civil service and federal procurement laws, the Freedom of Information
Act, 122 or federal budgetary concerns. Nongovernmental or private clas-
sification of an instrumentality's activities also avoids the constitutional
due process requirements applicable to the federal government. 123 How-
ever, several enterprises have lines of credit with the United States Treas-
ury, 124 and although the enterprises are privately owned, their boards of
directors include government-appointed directors. 125
The enterprises generally do not receive government appropriations.
Instead, the issuance of debt and mortgage-backed securities to private
investors constitute their primary source of financing. The federal gov-
ernment, however, does not guarantee or back these securities. 126 Like
Treasury securities, issues of enterprise debt and securities are approved
by the Secretary of the Treasury, exempt from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission registration requirements, issued and paid through
the Federal Reserve System, and enjoy an exemption from state and local
taxation on their incomes. 127
D. Implicit Federal Guarantee
Because enterprises, as federal instrumentalities, are similar to gov-
ernmental agencies, the public perceives enterprise obligations and secur-
ities as backed by the federal government. 128 The fact that enterprises
120. "Persons" who may file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code do not include "governmental units" or any other entities. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (Supp.
III 1991). A "governmental unit" includes an instrumentality of the United States. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(27). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to federal instrumentalities.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1993).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
123. See, e.g., Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 358-60 (5th Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 559 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1977); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 589 F.
Supp. 885, 896-97 (N.D. Cal. 1983), afl'd, 792 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Federal Home Loan Bank has a $4 billion line of credit; Federal National Mortgage
Association has a $2.25 billion line of credit; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation has a
$2.25 billion line of credit; Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation has a $1.5 billion line
of credit; Student Loan Marketing Association has a line of credit of up to $1 billion with the
Treasury to purchase obligations. See GAO, PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EN-
TERPRISES, supra note 4, at 7.
125. Five out of 18 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac directors and seven of Sallie Mae's 21
directors are appointed by the President of the United States. Id.
126. Debt obligations of the Financial Assistance Corporation are the sole exception. See
id. at 43.
127. Id. at 7.
128. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
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are permitted to borrow in credit markets at interest rates only slightly
higher than the Treasury and well below private corporate obligations
supports this perception. 129
In light of what is viewed as an "implicit federal guarantee" of en-
terprise debt, 130 many investors (both sophisticated and not) consider the
securities extremely safe investments. Moody's and Standard and Poor's,
private credit-rating agencies, have rated enterprise securities based on
the strength of this implied government guarantee, in spite of the knowl-
edge that no actual guarantee exists. 131 This perceived governmental
guarantee has contributed to the exponential growth in volume of enter-
prise securities, in turn magnifying the potential cost of enterprise insol-
vency and forcing the government to consider taking an active role to
prevent enterprise failure.
E. Too Big to Fail
"Too big to fail" describes the federal government's discretionary
policy of keeping large, troubled institutions in operation when the cost
of their failure would greatly exceed the cost of rescuing the institu-
tion.132 Congress has therefore opted to bail out industries, 133 municipal-
ities,134 foreign debtors, 135 and financial institutions. 136 Financial
129. GAO, PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 7.
130. See Stanton, supra note 21, at 153-66.
131. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at B-13. The Report of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury found that "[m]arket participants believe that, if [an enterprise] experiences extreme finan-
cial difficulties, Congress would step in to ensure that the debt holders and investors... would
experience no losses." Id at 8.
132. Economic Implications of the "Too Big to Fail" Policy: Hearing Before the Economic
Stabilization Subcomm. of the House Banking; Finance and Urban Affairs Comm., 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (referring to a statement of L. William Seidman, Chair-
man, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)).
133. The Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No 96-185, 93 Stat.
1324 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-75 (1988)); the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (assistance to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988)); United States Railway Association Amendments Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-565, 92 Stat. 2397 (codified at 45 U.S.C. 701 (1988)). See Block, supra note 3,
at 952-53.
134. New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460; New
York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797.
135. In 1982, the United States government provided over $5 billion in emergency assist-
ance to Mexico. If Mexico had defaulted on its $80 billion debt, the largest banks of America
and Europe could have failed, resulting in worldwide economic panic. WILLIAM GREIDER,
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 517-20
(1987). See generally DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE
CREDIT CRISIS (1984) (illustrating how the actions of foreign debt affects the world capital
markets).
136. The crisis caused by the failure of the nation's savings and loan institutions has
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institutions, whether enterprises, banks, thrifts, insurance companies,
brokerage firms, or pension funds, do not operate in isolation, but rather
have significant interlocking ties and investments. 137 The failure of a
large financial institution poses systemic risks to the economy because it
would disrupt the markets for federal funds, government securities,
mortgage-backed securities, and even foreign exchange. 138
Much of the enterprises' success has arisen from the high level of
interdependence between the national banking industry and the enter-
prises' secondary markets. The depository institutions participate in
both the supply and the demand of the enterprises' business by originat-
ing loans as a primary lender, then selling the loans to the enterprises in
exchange for mortgage-backed securities. 139 Nearly one trillion dollars
in enterprise debt and equity held by institutional and individual inves-
tors worldwide trades regularly in the national markets.' 4° By sheer
transactional volume and access to new, untapped sectors of the econ-
omy, enterprises have made themselves an indispensable, if not vital,
force to our nation's economic well-being.
For depository institutions, "too big to fail" means that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) elects to cover uninsured depos-
its in excess of the $100,000 insurance cap.141 The FDIC has discretion
to invoke the "too big to fail" policy if it determines that the insolvent
financial institution is "essential to the community."' 42 The phrase "too
big to fail" was coined in connection with the 1984 collapse of Continen-
tal Illinois National Bank, the first major bank failure in which the FDIC
paid all depositors, even for accounts exceeding the $100,000 insurance
cap. 143 The FDIC covered Continental Illinois' uninsured deposits be-
prompted one of the more dramatic, controversial, and expensive bailouts in American history.
Block, supra note 3, at 952.
137. For example, banks lend to and invest in other banks; banks invest in foreign coun-
tries through currency and international loans; banks participate with other financial institu-
tions to finance large projects; insurance companies and pension funds invest large sums in
jumbo certificates of deposit. See generally GREIDER, supra note 135.
138. See Hearing, supra note 132, at 5 (statement of Robert L. Clark, Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
139. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 27, at 1389.
140. GAO, A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS,
supra note 2, at 8.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988 & Supp. III. 1991).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G).
143. Continental Illinois: How Bad Judgments and Big Egos Did It In, WALL ST. J., July
30, 1984 at 1. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few To Serve? The
Potential Risk of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957 (1993).
By law the FDIC may liquidate a failed institution by paying the insured depositors,
closing the bank's doors, and letting creditors (including the uninsured deposits) wait for a pro
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cause of the extensive interdependence between Continental Illinois and
thousands of national banks and because of the fear that its failure and
liquidation would cause a ripple effect. 1" On a lower level, the govern-
ment invokes the "too big to fail" policy through regulatory leniency,
loans or advances to troubled institutions, 145 and sale of troubled
institutions. 146
Critics of the "too big to fail" policy have raised valid concerns re-
garding the inequitable treatment of small banks. In November of 1990,
the FDIC closed and liquidated Freedom National Bank, a small minor-
ity-owned bank located in Harlem. Initially, the FDIC refused to pay
$11.1 million in deposits above the $100,000 insurance cap. After much
controversy, the FDIC paid Freedom's depositors fifty cents for each
dollar of uninsured deposits.1 47 But just two months later the FDIC
closed the Bank of New England, a large regional bank, and chose to
fully protect all uninsured depositors, at a cost of $2 billion.a14
As a result, a common perception developed that the government
would always bail out larger institutions, market and consumer discipline
declined, and poor management and risky investments went un-
checked. 149 On the assumption that the Federal government would sup-
ply the safety net, management and shareholders were encouraged to
take greater risks in order to reap the benefits of increased profitability.
In the context of larger institutions, such behavior spelled a recipe for
disaster. In 1991 Congress responded by limiting the FDIC's free-wheel-
rata share of the remaining bank assets. Between 1985 and 1990, the FDIC protected over
99% of uninsured deposits in failed institutions. H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Corig., 1st Sess. 93
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1906.
144. Approximately 2300 banks were large depositors in Continental Illinois. GREIDER,
supra note 135, at 627. The FDIC had learned a costly lesson just two years earlier, when it
liquidated Penn Square Bank, a bank made insolvent by risky lending practices. Although a
relatively small midwestern bank, Penn Square had assigned $1 billion of its loans to Continen-
tal Illinois. William Isaac, then Chairman of the FDIC, believed that a rescue of Penn Square
Bank would tell other depository institutions "no matter what risks they take, the government
will bail them out." Id. at 501. Continental Illinois's losses from the Penn Square Bank liqui-
dation contributed significantly to its own failure two years later. Id.
145. When a bank gets into financial difficulty, it increases its borrowing at the Federal
Reserve Discount Window. These advances have been criticized because the institution is
allowed to delay its failure for an average of 10-12 months. During that time, the bank's
capital depletes further and ultimately increases the FDIC's losses. See H.R. REP. No. 330,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1907.
146. See infra Part V.
147. See Hearing, supra note 132, at 12.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id at 152.
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ing use of the "too big to fail" policy to situations in which a bailout was
least costly to the insurance fund.150
From an economic perspective, the massive size of enterprises and
their importance to other financial institutions make them "too big to
fail" because the resulting secondary markets are essential to the stability
of our monetary policies. By facilitating credit, enterprises play a vital
role in achieving housing, agricultural, and educational goals. Moreover,
an enterprise's failure could have ripple effects, such as bank failures,
economic turmoil, and disruption of social services.151
IV. The Congressional Response
A. The Reports
In the midst of channeling massive federal funding to rescue the
thrift industry, Congress realized that enterprises could also pose a sig-
nificant financial crisis. Thus Congress directed the Treasury Depart-
ment and the General Accounting Office to study the financial safety and
soundness of enterprises and to evaluate the federal government's expo-
sure to risk from the enterprises' activities. 152 The Treasury Department
found extremely thin capitalization among enterprises, but unlike other
private sector corporations, the enterprises' ties to the government took
them outside the scope of usual market-imposed discipline.1 53 Both the
Treasury and the General Accounting Office reported rapid enterprise
growth during the 1980s. This growth was attributable to the dramatic
expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac home-financing,154 the pre-
vailing market perception of government backing of enterprise obliga-
tions, and the lack of significant regulatory supervision. 55 The Treasury
determined that the financial risks inherent in the enterprises posed sys-
temic risks that were not susceptible to reduction through diversification
or market discipline.1 56
150. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, §§ 141-143, 105 Stat. 2236, 2273-82 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
151. A significant portion of enterprise securities are held by institutions covered by fed-
eral insurance. If these institutions became insolvent as a result of an enterprise's failure, the
government would have to cover the federally insured accounts. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S
EXPOSURE TO RisKs, supra note 5, at 94.
152. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
§ 1404, 103 Stat. 183, 551 (1989).
153. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
154. Id. at 2-3. Between 1980 and 1989, enterprise securities outstanding grew at a 19.2%
compounded rate from $177 billion in 1980 to $863 billion in 1989. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The Treasury and the Government Accounting Office suggested
that strong regulatory supervision would insure enterprise financial
safety and soundness. 157 The Treasury further concluded that without
initiation of effective government oversight, Congress should terminate
all ties with the enterprises. 158
B. 1992 Safety and Soundness Act
Congress responded on October 28, 1992, by passing the Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992.159
This Act increases regulatory supervision of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks, and explicitly states that the govern-
ment does not guarantee enterprise debt.16° The Act also intensifies the
difficulties inherent in the enterprises' split personalities by reaffirming
the enterprises' public policy objectives1 61 and committing the govern-
ment to an active role in the supervision of enterprise operations, while
simultaneously attempting to distance the Treasury from liability.
The Safety and Soundness Act created the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (Office of Oversight), a new regulator within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, to supervise the hous-
ing enterprises. 162 This new regulator, independent from the enterprises,
possesses greatly strengthened regulatory powers within specific guide-
lines. 163 These provisions mirror legislation enacted in 1991 to
strengthen the powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), requiring the regulators to take prompt action to enforce the
laws. 164 The Safety and Soundness Act also requires minimum capital
standards and specific agency action in the event of the undercapitaliza-
tion of an enterprise, as it did with depository institutions. 165
157. I at 7-15; GAO, A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE
TO RISKS, supra note 2, at 4.
158. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
159. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1301, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4501
(Supp. IV 1992)).
160. 12 U.S.C. § 4503.
161. 12 U.S.C. § 4501. The Act requires enterprises to reafflirm their commitment to pro-
vide financing for low and moderate income families. Id
162. 12 U.S.C. § 4511. The Federal Housing Finance Board remains responsible for the
regulatory supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank. See supra note 52.
163. See generally Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4513.
164. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, §§ 141-143, 105 Stat. 2236, 2273-82 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see
also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4620.
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The Safety and Soundness Act grants strong remedial powers to the
Office of Oversight, including the power to appoint a conservator for an
enterprise if it becomes critically undercapitalized. 166 In such a situation,
the conservator operates or disposes of the enterprise as a going concern,
restores the enterprise's soundness and solvency, or controls the enter-
prise's business in order to conserve its assets and property.1 67 The Di-
rector of the Office of Oversight has discretionary authority to appoint a
conservator for an enterprise with prior notice to Congress and the enter-
prise. 168 The enterprise has no statutory right to prevent the appoint-
ment and may only challenge it during a twenty-day period beginning
upon appointment of the conservator by bringing an action for re-
moval. 169 Even then, removal is premised upon a showing that the con-
servatorship decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
not otherwise in accordance with applicable law.170
Appointment power is discretionary to facilitate prompt regulatory
action. These appointment powers strikingly resemble the powers of
banking regulators to appoint a conservator or receiver for financially
troubled banks and thrifts.171 However, the omission of the power to
appoint a receiver for enterprises reflects Congress's conclusion that the
enterprises are indeed "too big to fail." The conservator's function in
continuing to operate a business distinguishes it from a receiver who is
charged with liquidation of the business. 172 In light of the parallels be-
tween the Safety and Soundness Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, case law involving banking and
thrift receivers and conservators is illustrative precedent for defining the
powers of a conservator of an enterprise.
V. Lessons from the Failed Banks and Thrifts
A. Regulatory "Resolve"
The case law emerging from the banking and thrift crisis has con-
sistently supported the government's policy of riding roughshod over the
166. 12 U.S.C. § 4617.
167. 12 U.S.C. § 4620. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D-E) (Supp. 1 1989) (setting forth the
FDIC's powers as conservator and receiver).
168. 12 U.S.C. § 4619(a)(3).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 4618(b)(1).
170. Id.
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c).
172. The conservator of an enterprise succeeds to all the powers of its shareholders, of-
ficers, and directors. Safety and Soundness Act, § 12 U.S.C § 4620. In the context of banks
and thrifts, federal deposit insurance also confers the interests of the depositors upon the re-
ceiver or conservator. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1 1989) (banks); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2)(E)(i) (Supp. III 1991) (savings associations).
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interests of private parties. The government-appointed conservators and
receivers possess "superpowers," which subject any person engaged in
business with the financial institution to the loss of basic legal rights.
Most notably, after the appointment of a conservator or receiver, the
shareholders, creditors, and borrowers of the failed financial institutions
suffer unexpected losses due to modification of their legal rights.
When a receiver or conservator is appointed for a federally insured
bank or thrift, the federal regulator assumes the dual roles of receiver or
conservator of the institution and insurer of deposits. 173 By law, the con-
servator or receiver steps into the shoes of the stockholders, officers, and
directors of the failed institution. 174 The receiver is appointed to liqui-
date the institution and resolve its affairs. The conservator operates the
institution as a going concern to restore the institution to a sound and
safe condition. The interests of the FDIC, in its corporate capacity as
insurer of deposits, are subrogated to the rights of the depositors. The
receiver or conservator acts in tandem with the FDIC to "resolve" the
failed institution in order to promote the stability of and confidence in
the nation's banking industry. 175 The FDIC pays the insured deposits of
the depository institution, and if the regulators determine that the failed
institution is "too big to fail," the FDIC infuses additional funds to cover
the uninsured deposits. 176
To "resolve" the failed institution, the FDIC may choose to liqui-
date by paying off depositors and closing the institution. Liquidation is
not the favored method because the sight of a closed bank diminishes
confidence in the banking system. 177 Further, since liquidation freezes
accounts and can cause depositors to face significant delays in recovering
funds, liquidation disrupts the intricate financial machinery of the
economy.178
To avoid these problems, the FDIC favors a "purchase and assump-
tion" transaction in which it sells the failed institution to a solvent one,
allowing reopening of the bank with no interruption and with no loss to
depositors. 179 The acquiring institution receives the failed institution's
assets and assumes all of its deposits (insured and uninsured). 80 The
173. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1978).
174. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2).
175. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-70 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).







FDIC, as corporate insurer, compensates the acquiring institution for the
failed association's negative net worth-the difference between the
purchased assets and the assumed liabilities (insured plus uninsured de-
posits).181 The regulators try to complete the purchase and assumption
quickly to avoid interruption in banking services.
B. Shareholders
The shareholders of a failed financial institution subject to conserva-
torship lose their investment when the institution is deemed insolvent or
unsafe to transact business. Loss of equity is a known business risk, but
it is the shareholder's unexpected losses caused by governmental actions
and allowed by an acquiescent judiciary that has shifted the benefits of
corporate responsibility in the government's favor. First, as a regulator,
the agency owes no duty to shareholders, even for negligent acts that
may cause the institution financial problems. 1 2 Second, shareholders
have no recourse to challenge the appointment of a conservator because
of the complete judicial deference given to agency decisions.18 3 Courts
consistently have ignored shareholder claims that the appointment of a
conservator constitutes a seizure of property without due process and
have upheld such appointments.18 4 Third, shareholders cannot rely on
prior agreements with the regulators if these agreements are later ren-
dered voidable for public policy reasons. Finally, several jurisdictions
have permitted government-appointed conservators to stay shareholder
claims against related third parties, granting the government priority in
collection against those related third parties.8 5 Collectively, these "su-
perpowers" elevate government interests to a superior position, and al-
low courts to disregard shareholder rights and ban all shareholder
redress against parties responsible for an institution's financial instability.
The appointment of a conservator, in effect, nullifies all shareholder
claims.
181. See Hearing, supra note 132, at 152.
182. See infra notes 186-197 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
184. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-56 (1947); Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Office of
Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1475
(1992); First Fed. Sav. Bank & Trust v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345, 1357-58 (6th Cir.) cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 187 (1991); Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1410-13 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home
Loan Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
185. See infra notes 235-245 and accompanying text.
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(1) No Duty to Shareholders
Regulators of an insured depository institution enjoy immunity
from liability for negligent actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).186 By denying such shareholder claims, the Supreme Court
verified the absence of any duty to the institution187 or its shareholders1 88
owed by regulators exercising their broad supervisory discretion.1 89 The
"discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claim Act190 pre-
cludes claims based on an agency's performance or nonperformance of a
discretionary function. 191 In the banking context, policy decisions to ex-
ercise agency powers, such as issuance of cease and desist orders or ap-
pointment of a conservator or receiver, rest solely within the discretion of
the regulators and outside the scope of any judicial review.' 92
In United States v. Gaubert,193 the Supreme Court applied the dis-
cretionary function exception to immunize agency negligence, leading to
the insolvency of an insured financial institution. In the 1991 case, the
186. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
187. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carter, 701 F. Supp. 730, 735-37 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See
also In re Franklin Nat'l Bank See. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Franklin I); In
re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (Franklin II) (holding
regulatory agencies not liable absent a showing that they acted arbitrarily and capriciously,
exceeded their regulatory authority, or actively managed the bank).
188. Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156, 157 (9th Cir. 1978). Regulators have no duty to
warn bank officers, directors, or depositors of irregularities found in examinations. Emch v.
United States, 630 F.2d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); First
State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 565 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 1013
(1980); Davis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D. Colo. 1974).
189. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1275.
190. The discretionary function exception provides that the Government is not liable for:
any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
191. Despite the statute's failure to define a "discretionary function," courts have gener-
ally immunized decisions based on social, economic, and political policy grounds., See United
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)
(aircraft certification); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (lighthouse
maintenance); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (fertilizing manufacture); Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (bank closure); Ingham v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2nd Cir.) (aircraft controller's reports), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967).
192. Carter, 701 F. Supp. at 735-37; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jennings, 615 F.
Supp. 465 (W.D. Okla. 1985). Some courts have distinguished these policy decisions from
routine operational governmental tasks. Carter, 701 F. Supp. at 734-36; see also cases cited
infra note 207.
193. 111 S.Ct. 1267 (1991).
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Supreme Court found that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's negli-
gent day-to-day involvement and supervision of a thrift fell within the
discretionary function exception because the actions were attributable to
the public policy decision to provide federal oversight of the industry. 194
The Supreme Court recognized that Congress had empowered banking
regulators to supervise financial institutions in order to protect the insur-
ance fund and had allowed them to decide when and how to supervise
the financial institutions. 195 The Court stated that the regulators have
the discretion to supervise through informal means as well as by invoking
statutory sanctions.1 96 For this reason, the Court determined that de-
spite agency negligence, its actions necessarily involved the exercise of
discretion in furtherance of the public policy goal of protecting the insur-
ance fund; therefore, they were within the scope of federal government
immunity.1 97
(2) Challenging Conservatorship
The appointment of a conservator 98 for an insured depository insti-
tution signals the extinguishment of its equity value. Shareholders, faced
with the loss of the past and future value of their equity, vigorously con-
test conservatorship as an unconstitutional deprivation of property with-
194. Id. at 1277. The Supreme Court dismissed earlier decisions in which some courts
classified the agency's assumption of ministerial or proprietary banking tasks-such as dispos-
ing of a failed bank's assets or the collection of debts-as falling outside the "discretionary
function" exception of the FTCA. One court has set "the dividing line for the FDIC's negli-
gence liability [as generally being] the date it assumes receivership of a bank." Carter, 701 F.
Supp. at 737. The court recognized that some of the FDIC's decisions after the imposition of
the receiver will still be subject to the discretionary function exception. Id.
195. Gaubert, Ill S. Ct. at 1277-78.
196. Id. at 1277.
197. Id. at 1279-80. In another case, the government faced no liability for the conse-
quences of its remedial measures as conservator. Gibraltar Say. v. Ryan, 772 F. Supp. 1290
(D.D.C. 1991). In Gibraltar, the Office of Thrift Supervision replaced the acting conservator
of a thrift with a receiver on insolvency. Id. at 1291. The association pointed to its solvency
prior to the conservator's appointment, claiming that the insolvency was due to the conserva-
tor's actions. Id. at 1294. Gibraltar had invested substantially in fixed-rate, mortgage-backed
securities, the market value of which declined because of a rise in interest rates. Id. at 1295.
The conservator rejected the association's proposal to hedge the portfolio and liquidated it at a
loss of $229 million. Id. Although this loss contributed to Gibraltar's insolvency, the court
stated that the conservator's failure to remedy the association's financial difficulties could not
provide a basis for removing an otherwise properly appointed receiver. Id. See also In re
Conservatorship of Wellsville Nat'l Bank, 407 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir.) (holding bank comptroller's
decision that bank was insolvent not subject to review), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
198. Federal law permits the appointment of a conservator or receiver for an insured de-
pository institution. The discussion of the appointment of a conservator throughout this sec-
tion also applies to the appointment of a receiver for a depository institution.
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out due process of law. 199 Congress empowered the Director of the
Office of Oversight with the discretion to appoint a conservator for Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac contingent on prior notice to Congress and the
enterprise. 200 The courts have consistently upheld the ex parte appoint-
ments of conservators and receivers of banks and thrifts because of the
overriding governmental interests in securing the financial stability of the
banking industry and protecting insured deposits.20 1 In 1947, the
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the exparte appointment
without notice or predeprivation hearing for a federally chartered savings
association. 20 2 The Court reasoned that because national associations are
chartered by the federal government, they are consequently subject to its
limitations. 20 3
Recently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the regulatory power to appoint
banking conservators or receivers without prior notice or hearing be-
cause it furthered an important governmental interest-the safety of the
banking system.2°4 The Sixth Circuit noted that insolvency of an institu-
tion mandated prompt action and that the statutes authorizing such
prompt action appropriately circumscribed agency authority to appoint
conservators and receivers. 20 5 Accordingly, the Office of Oversight's
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
200. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C.
§ 4619 (Supp. IV 1992). Although the Director must give notice prior to the appointment of
the conservator, this notice is merely a formality because the statute does not provide for either
a waiting period or an opportunity for the enterprise to stop the appointment.
201. See cases cited supra note 184.
202. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 256 (1947).
203. In Fahey, the Court rejected the shareholders' claim that the application of federal
laws and regulations to the institution violated due process:
[I]t would be intolerable that the Congress should endow an association with the
right to conduct a public banking business on certain limitations and that the Court
at the behest of those who took advantage from the privilege should remove the
limitations intended for public protection.
Id.
204. First Fed. Say. Bank & Trust v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345, 1358 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 187 (1991).
205. Id. The court applied the three-prong test from Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91
(1972), to determine when the government can seize property without prior hearing. First
Federal, 927 F.2d at 1358. See also Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory
Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 367 (1990) (indicating Congress and
agencies can use their constitutional power to intervene and regulate economic activities with-
out a taking). In First Federal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the association's remedy to
sue for damages arising out of a wrongful appointment satisfied due process under the Fifth
Amendment, thus eliminating any need for the judiciary to provide equitable relief. First Fed-
eral, 927 F.2d at 1358. The Sixth Circuit also rejected the association's claim that the appoint-
ment of a conservator or receiver without prior judicial review violates the provisions of
Article III and stated that the appointment is an executive rather than a judicial power. Id. at
1359.
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power to appoint a conservator for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would
probably be upheld as constitutional since the enterprises were chartered
by Congress and subject to the limitations of the statutes. The conserva-
torship would be deemed necessary to preserve the government's objec-
tive of improving the housing industry.
Agency decisions to appoint a conservator are generally not subject
to judicial review prior to the actual appointment20 6 because review
would undermine the regulators' ability to minimize losses.207 In fur-
therance of this policy, Congress specifically banned any judicial attempt
to restrain or affect the exercise of the conservator's powers or
functions.20 8
In the 1992 Safety and Soundness Act, Congress granted enterprises
the right to challenge an appointment of a conservator through a postap-
pointment action to remove the conservator. 2°9 Case law from bank and
thrift actions shows that this removal action is difficult because courts
defer to the agency decision.210 The agency need only show, subject to
review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the existence of a
206. American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991); First Federal, 927
F.2d at 1352-55. But see Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 732
F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed and remanded, 903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
207. See Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Shemonsky v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 733 F. Supp. 892, 895
(M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 922 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1595 (1991). The
association has the exclusive means of challenging the appointment of a conservator or re-
ceiver, though bank holding companies and majority shareholders have joined suit with as-
sociations in removal actions. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d
1127 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215
(1984). When neither the association nor its parent company challenged the appointment of a
receiver, shareholders of the parent company, acting in a derivative capacity, lacked standing
to challenge the receiver. FDIC v. American Bank Trust Shares, 460 F. Supp. 549, 557-58
(D.S.C. 1979), affid, 629 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1980). Additionally, borrowers of a failed financial
institution lack standing to question the validity of the appointment of a receiver or conserva-
tor. See FDIC v. Marina, 892 F.2d 1522, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1990); Shemonsky, 733 F. Supp.
at 892; In re Liquidation of Am. City Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 402 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Commerce Partners, 132 F.R.D. 443 (W.D. La. 1990).
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(D) (Supp. 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(3) (Supp. 1991). Even
while denying the prudence of an association's action to remove a conservator, courts cannot
enjoin the sale of the assets of the association. First Federal, 927 F.2d at 1358 ; Haralson v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 837 F.2d. 1123, 1125-26 (D.C.Cir. 1988). In First Federal, the
Sixth Circuit refused to enjoin the regulator's "draconian" practice of appointing the receiver
on a Friday, executing a sale of the association over the weekend, and opening the institution
under its purchaser's name on Monday. First Federal, 927 F.2d at 1358.
209. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C.
§ 4619 (Supp. IV 1992).
210. See American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, 933 F.2d at 902-04.
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statutory ground for the appointment.211 In the face of increasing num-
bers of bank and thrift failures during the 1980s, the courts construed the
limits of judicial review to negate virtually any possibility of removing a
conservator or receiver.212
A court will remove a conservator or receiver only if no statutory
ground for appointment exists.213 However, despite statutory language
that provides for consideration' "upon the merits, ' 214 evidence is re-
stricted to the agency's administrative record. This presumption of cor-
rectness renders the underlying wisdom of the agency's decision
211. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1946). Whether an agency acts arbi-
trarily or capriciously depends upon the amount of discretion afforded to the agency by stat-
ute. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 904-05 (D.D.C. 1990). Congress
granted the banking regulators considerable discretion and exclusive authority to appoint con-
servators and receivers in order to safeguard insured deposits. Id at 905. Therefore, a request
for removal under the arbitrary and capricious standard is denied simply upon a showing that
the agency had the underlying facts when it acted, from which it could reasonably conclude
that a statutory ground for the appointment existed. The courts grant even greater deference
to the agency's decision based upon technical indices, such as unacceptable levels of high risk
assets, unacceptable levels of liabilities, accounting standards, level of loan loss reserves, and
predictions of future losses. Franklin Sav. Ass'n, 934 F. 2d at 1148. The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the appointment of a receiver notwithstanding arbitrary and capricious conduct by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F.2d at 1504. Citing
the broad grant of powers to banking regulators, the Eleventh Circuit expressly limited its
review to the existence of a statutory ground for the appointment and explicitly banned consid-
eration of the regulators' conduct. Id. at 1505.
212. Even when district courts granted relief to associations in the most egregious situa-
tions, appellate courts uniformly reversed those decisions. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at
1127; Biscayne Fed Sa. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F.2d at 1502-05; Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982).
213. Biscayne Fed Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F.2d at 1502-05.
214. Id The scope of judicial review refers to evidence the court will examine in reviewing
agency decisions. The standard of review refers to how the reviewing court will examine the
evidence. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1136. In Franklin Savings the Tenth Circuit con-
fined the scope of review of appointment decisions to the administrative record in accord with
the Administrative Procedure Act. Id at 1138. In removal actions, the agency must produce
the documents which it relied upon in making its decision. The information must show a
rational basis for the appointment. Id at 1139. This restrictive standard precludes associa-
tions from introducing banking matters. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the reviewing
court may go beyond the administrative record in limited circumstances to determine, for
example, whether the record fails to disclose the factors considered by the agency or whether
the agency considered all relevant factors including evidence contrary to the agency's position.
Id The Supreme Court has allowed the administrative record to be supplemented with oral
testimony of administrative officials explaining their action. Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 400 U.S. 939 (1970). However, the Supreme Court strongly discouraged
inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisions and limited these questions to
occasions when there is clear showing of bad faith or wrongdoing. Id See also United States




irrelevant. 215 An association must demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that the decision had no basis in fact or law.216 Although the
enterprise has the right to challenge the appointment of a conservator,
the enterprise would face the same barriers as the banks and thrifts be-
cause the discretion to appoint the conservator lies completely with the
Director of the Office of Oversight.
(3) Fair Play or Unlawful Taking?: The Power to Ignore Prior Agreements
During the 1980s, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration (FSLIC)217 did not have the money to absorb the costs of insolvent
thrifts, and Congress and the Executive branch refused to acknowledge
the problems inherent in the thrift industry.218 Financially troubled
thrifts with debt-laden balance sheets desperately needed liquidation or
merger with solvent associations in order to stem losses. To urge merg-
ers between healthy member thrifts and troubled associations, the FSLIC
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)21 9 created an ac-
counting gimmick dubbed "supervisory goodwill. ' 220 The FHLBB al-
lowed supervisory goodwill to be considered an asset of the acquiring
institution equivalent to the negative net worth-assets minus liabili-
ties-of the troubled association. 221 Normally, the acquiring institutions
would have had negative net worth after acquiring the troubled thrift.
Treating supervisory goodwill as an asset enabled the healthy thrifts to
meet regulatory capital requirements. 222 The acquiring institution as-
sumed the deposits of the failed institution, and the FHLBB permitted
the acquiring association to amortize the supervisory goodwill for peri-
ods of up to forty years. 223 In this manner, the FSLIC avoided using
insurance funds to compensate the acquiring association for the unprofit-
able merger.224
215. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 934 F.2d at 1135-36.
216. Id.
217. FSLIC insured the deposits of thrifts until 1989. See Federal Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), § 401, 103 Stat. at 354-57.
218. See Transohio Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 601-04 (D.C.
Cir 1992).
219. The FHLBB regulated the thrifts until 1989. See FIRREA, § 401, 103 Stat. at 354-
57.
220. See Transohio, 967 F.2d at 602.
221. See Charter Fed. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 205-06 (4th
Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 206.
223. Id. at 205-06.
224. See Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11 th Cir. 1991). Under these
agreements, the regulator would "forbear" enforcing the minimal capital standards by consid-
ering the supervisory goodwill part of capital. Id. at 996.
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Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA),225 Congress increased the required mini-
mum capital standards for thrifts, providing a transition rule that limited
the amount of supervisory goodwill. 226 FIRREA provides that the in-
ability of any thrift to maintain minimum capital standards is an unsafe
and unsound practice-a statutory ground for conservatorship or receiv-
ership.227 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)228 applied these new
capital standards to all thrifts, even those with prior supervisory goodwill
agreements. 229
Several thrifts sued the OTS to enforce the supervisory goodwill
agreements when the retraction of supervisory goodwill caused otherwise
solvent thrifts to fall below the statutory minimum capital standards and
thereby become subject to impending closure.230 Even though several
district courts initially ruled in favor of the associations,231 courts of ap-
peal have reversed the district courts, stating that FIRREA's new capital
requirements supersede prior supervisory goodwill agreements. 232 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that regulatory forbearance permitted the
existence and amortization of supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital
only for as long as the law allowing the forbearances remained intact.233
225. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1404, 103 Stat. 183, 551 (1989).
226. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 303.
227. Id
228. This agency was created to regulate the thrifts. See H.R. REP. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 106 (1990).
229. CapitalAdequacy, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION THRIFT BULLETIN, Jan. 9, 1990,
at 38-2.
230. Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992);
Transohio Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir 1992); Security
Say. & Loan v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1992); Far West Fed.
Bank, S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991); Guaranty Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991); First Fed. Say. Bank & Trust v. Ryan, 927 F.2d
1345 (6th Cir. 1991); Ensign Fin. Corp. v. FDIC, 785 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Hansen
Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 758 F. Supp. 240 (D.N.J. 1991); Sterling Say. Ass'n
v. Ryan, 751 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Wash. 1990); Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp.
742 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
231. A few district courts, determining that FIRREA did not abrogate the forbearance
agreements, enjoined the OTS from applying the new capital standards. Sterling Say. Ass'n,
751 F. Supp. at 881; Hansen Say. Bank, 758 F. Supp. at 247. One district court took the
position that a forbearance agreement was an integral part of a merger of institutions-so
integral that its disregard by the OTS mandated rescission of the original transaction and
restoration of the institution to its premerger state. Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 773 F. Supp. 809, 824-28 (W.D. Va. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1992).
232. Far West Fed. Bank, 951 F.2d at 1097-1100; Guaranty Fin. Servs, 928 F.2d at 1003;
Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F.2d 1332, 1338-41 (6th Cir.
1991).
233. Guaranty Fin. Servs, 928 F.2d at 1001. Some Circuit Courts have implied that an
action for taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment will provide remedy for the contractual
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The supervisory goodwill problems call into question the enforceability
of agency agreements if and when governmental policies change. As reg-
ulated entities, the enterprises must be entitled to rely on agency
agreements. 234
(4) FDIC Priority Over Shareholder Actions
Even after an insured depository institution closes, the FDIC and
the institution's shareholders directly compete for the assets of the insti-
tution's affiliated third parties.235 The officers, directors, attorneys, ac-
countants, or other parties affiliated with the failed institution are liable
to suit by the FDIC, as successor to the failed institution, if any of their
actions or omissions contributed to the institution's failure.236 Because
the FDIC sues as the institution, shareholders may only assert nonderiv-
ative claims against affiliated parties.237 The FDIC has recognized that
the first to judgment or settlement will benefit from the affiliated parties'
rights abrogation. In a case reaching the takings issue, the Claims Court determined that the
government breached a supervisory goodwill agreement and is liable for damages, but has yet
to rule on the appropriate measure of damages or restitution. Winstar Corp. v. United States,
25 Cl. Ct. 541, 547-49, 553 (1992); see Statesman Say. Holding Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.
904 (1992).
234. The abrogation of the supervisory goodwill agreements threatens the enforceability of
all agency agreements and arguably could be precedent for other agencies, such as the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and the Securities Exchange Commission, to negative prior
contracts.
235. See Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
§ 901, 103 Stat. at 446-50.
236. The FDIC, as receiver, succeeds to the rights of the institution-its stockholders,
members, account holders, depositors, officers, directors, and assets. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). The FDIC pays insured deposits of a failed institution, whether
by liquidation or purchase and assumption. When it does so, the FDIC is subrogated to all
rights of depositors against the institution by statute, and the FDIC as receiver assigns the
institution's assets, including its causes of action, to the FDIC as insurer. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g)
(Supp. 1991); see Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 385 n.1 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Gunter v.
Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). Accordingly,
the FDIC has standing to bring suit against institution-affiliated third parties in both its receiv-
ership and corporate capacities.
237. Because Congress requires FIRREA to provide the exclusive remedy to claimants
against an insolvent financial institution, shareholder recourse lies only in pursuing an admin-
istrative claim under either FIRREA or through another statutory structure entirely, such as
RICO or the federal securities laws. Shareholders lack standing to assert derivative claims
where their injuries are not direct and distinct from injury sustained by the corporation and
the other shareholders. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir.
1989); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Leach v. FDIC,
860 F.2d 1266, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); Crocker v. FDIC,
826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988). Shareholders can only
bring nonderivative claims against bank-related third parties because the right to the derivative
action is held by the FDIC. See FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1538-39 (1lth Cir. 1989).
"A derivative action is one 'in which the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corpora-
[Vol. 44
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
larger pool of assets.238 Consequently, the FDIC has vigorously asserted
its entitlement to priority over shareholders and has endeavored to stay
all shareholder actions pending resolution of its own claims. 239
Circuit courts are split on the priority of the FDIC or share-
holder.240 Finding no congressional intent under the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act 241 to create an absolute priority rule,242 the Eleventh Circuit
refused to fashion a common-law rule of FDIC priority.243 By contrast,
the Sixth Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit's analysis by creating a
federal common-law rule of FDIC priority.244 The Sixth Circuit distin-
tion could itself have enforced in court.'" Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167, 189 (4th Cir.
1990) (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 529 (1984)).
238. Claims by depositors and other creditors against bank-related third parties have been
generally dismissed as derivative. See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 889 (3d Cir.
1990); Downriver Community Fed. Credit Union v. Penn Square Bank, 879 F.2d 754, 764
(10th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179,
1191 (4th Cir. 1988); Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111, 1117 (2d Cir. 1979) ("m]ndividual
depositors may sue in their own right [under banking laws] if they have suffered a wrong that
is distinctly theirs and not common to all.").
239. Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 396-97 (4th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 933 F.2d 400
(1991) (granting FDIC priority); Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1990) (re-
jecting FDIC priority); FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting FDIC
priority).
240. See supra note 239.
241. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. 1991).
242. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the conference committee rejected an FIRREA
amendment to grant the FDIC priority. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1538 n.l. One Congressman
explained that the rejected amendment had not received adequate attention by Congress and
FDIC priority would undermine fraud enforcement and be unfair to private plaintiffs. 135
CONG. REc. H4985 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Glickman). The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) had filed an amicus brief in Jenkins to oppose the FDIC, arguing
that the priority would be a disincentive to private fraud suits and would harm the SEC's
enforcement scheme. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1540 n.5. The conference committee was aware of
the SEC's opposition to FDIC priority, the amicus brief in Jenkins, and the SEC's argument
that private actions are a necessary supplement to enforcement actions of the SEC and Depart-
ment of Justice. 135 CONG. RFc. H4985 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Glick-
man). See Samantha Evans, Note, An FDIC Priority of Claims over Depository Institution
Shareholders, 41 DUKE L.J. 329, 359-64 (1991).
243. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1544-46. The Jenkins court distinguished the FDIC's priority
from the bankruptcy principle that shareholders do not recover from the corporate assets until
the general creditors' claims have been satisfied. Id. at 1545. The shareholders in Jenkins were
not attempting to collect from assets of the bank, but against the assets of solvent third parties.
Id
244. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 388. The court recognized that federal law has consistently been
applied to the FDIC when it operates in its corporate capacity. Id; see FDIC v. Leach, 772
F.2d 1262, 1207-08 (6th Cir. 1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). Although reaching opposite rulings, both Circuits relied upon the
Supreme Court's factors enunciated in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979), to determine whether a uniform federal rule should be created. In Kimbell, the
Supreme Court articulated three factors to assist courts in deciding whether a federal rule of
law should displace state rules of commercial law. The Court defined the issues as follows: (1)
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guished the corporate responsibility of banks from that of corporations
by noting that the primary expectation of the national banks lay in pre-
serving deposits, not in shareholder suits against officers and directors for
fraud or mismanagement. 245 On this basis, the Sixth Circuit determined
that a federal rule granting FDIC priority over shareholder claims
against third parties would not defeat commercial expectations under
state law. 246
Whether the FDIC would have priority over other private party
claims against common defendants is even more significant in the context
of enterprises because an enterprise's business is to buy and sell securities
through the secondary market. 247 As with banks and thrifts, if the con-
servator of an enterprise were to step into the shoes of the institution and
be entitled to bring suit against third parties on behalf of the enterprise,
then private parties would be limited to nonderivative actions.
The key distinction between banks and enterprises on this issue is
that enterprises are exempt from federal securities laws. Banks' securi-
ties, offered through private payments, public offerings, or the public
stock market, are subject to scrutiny under federal securities laws and
regulations. 248 Housing enterprises offer their securities nationwide in a
market that is second in size only to the market for U.S. Treasury obliga-
tions. 249 These enterprise securities have been exempted from the securi-
ties laws. As a result, private parties purchasing enterprise obligations
have little protection against fraud or mismanagement. FDIC priority
over private-party suits against related third parties after the appoint-
ment of a conservator would diminish the value of the enterprise's obliga-
tions and devalue the financial status of the entities owning these
obligations. FDIC priority would further disrupt the commercial expec-
tations of investors.
whether the program needs national uniformity, id. at 728; (2) whether the application of state
law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, id.; and (3) whether the applica-
tion of a federal rule of common law would frustrate settled commercial practices predicated
on state law, id. at 729. The Sixth Circuit found that the bank insurance system required
national uniformity and could not meet statutory objectives if subjected to varying state laws.
Gaff, 919 F.2d at 389.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 390.
247. As of 1989, Fannie Mae reported $116.1 billion in debt outstanding, and Freddie Mac
had issued $272.9 billion in mortgage-backed securities. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2,
at A-8 (for Fannie Mae) and B-37 (for Freddie Mac).
248. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. VII 1993).





Creditors250 of an insolvent bank or thrift have difficulty collecting
claims against the failed institution. They are entitled to receive the liq-
uidated value of their claim.251 However, the courts tolerate unequal
treatment of creditors. 252 When a receiver is appointed for a failed bank
or thrift, the receiver values the institution's assets and liabilities. If lia-
bilities exceed assets, creditors' claims are deemed "worthless." 25 3 Once
the "worthless" determination has been made, the receiver has complete
discretion to pay some creditors or give others nothing.254
When a troubled institution is transferred by a purchase and as-
sumption agreement, the acquiring bank assumes the failed bank's depos-
its, but might not assume other liabilities, thus leaving some creditors
with the failed bank.25 5 The regulators transfer the assets of the failed
institution to the acquiring institution. In this transfer, the creditors are
not assumed by the acquiring institution, but remain creditors of the
worthless receivership estate.256 The Fifth Circuit upheld the regulators'
determination that these unsecured creditors' claims were worthless
when the failed financial institution's assets were insufficient to cover de-
posits and secured creditors.257 Accordingly, the claims of unsecured
creditors were deemed moot as the liquidation value of the claims was
zero. 258 Since there is no practical purpose in adjudicating the merits of




To recover for the losses of one failed subsidiary, federal regulators
can reach the assets of bank holding companies260 and their subsidiaries.
250. The term "creditors" as used in this section excludes the insured depositors.
251. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) (Supp. 1991); see Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954
F.2d 329, 340 (5th Cir. 1992).
252. Texas Am. Bancshares, 954 F.2d at 329.
253. See Gulley v. Sunbelt Say. F.S.B., 902 F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 1990).
254. See Texas Am. Bancshares, 954 F.2d at 329.
255. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869 (11th Cir. 1982).
256. Gulley, 902 F.2d at 357 (federal regulatory transactions not subject to state fraudu-
lent conveyance laws).
257. Id. at 356.
258. Id.
259. First Indiana Fed. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 964 F.2d 503, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1992); 281-300
Joint Venture v. Onion, 938 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir. 1992).
260. A bank holding company is any company that controls either a bank or another
company that itself controls a bank. 12 U.S.C § 1841(a) (1988).
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Several bank holding companies have challenged the Comptroller of Cur-
rency and the FDIC on the grounds that closing all of the holding com-
panies' subsidiary banks when only one or more of the subsidiaries have
failed violates the National Bank Act.26 1 Thereby, the holding compa-
nies do not merely lose the weak subsidiary banks, but all subsidiary
banks share the cost of resolving the financial problems of any other
subsidiary. 262
The typical scenario that leads to the insolvency and closure of
banks is as follows: The weakest subsidiary has borrowed heavily from
its affiliated subsidiaries and from other nonaffiliated institutions through
federal funds or unsecured debt. Upon appointment of a receiver for the
insolvent subsidiary, the FDIC pays the nonaffiliated debts at face value,
but devalues the affiliated debt to liquidation value. In turn, these losses
incurred by the affiliated creditors-the difference between the full value
and the liquidation value of the debt-make the subsidiary insolvent.
Then, through a domino effect, the Comptroller closes the other affiliated
institutions. 263 This scheme enables the FDIC to sell the holding com-
pany's banking system as a whole through purchase and assumption
transactions.
In Texas American Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, the Fifth Circuit up-
held the regulators' actions, stating that the law merely required credi-
tors to be paid the liquidation value of their claim, and that the FDIC's
additional payments to creditors was discretionary. 264 However, the
conservator or receiver of a bank or thrift must pay the creditors at least
the liquidation value of their claims, and has discretion to pay some cred-
itors more. In an enterprise, the creditors are the persons and institu-
tions holding mortgage-backed securities and other enterprise
obligations. A conservator of an enterprise treats creditors differently
than the banks and thrifts. The conservator of an enterprise is not re-
quired to pay creditors the liquidation value of their claims, but must
treat all similarly situated creditors in the same manner.
261. Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1992); First
Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1369-71 (9th Cir. 1978); M Corp v. Clarke,
755 F. Supp. 1402, 1408, 1422-23 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Senior Unsecured Creditors Comm. of
First Republic Bank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758, 768-71 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
262. See M Corp., 755 F. Supp. at 1408, 1422-23.
263. Texas Am. Bancshares, 954 F.2d at 329, 333-34. Thirteen subsidiaries were deemed
insolvent when the FDIC agreed to pay only 67% of the face amount of the obligations owed
by the bank holding company. The subsidiaries would have remained solvent if the FDIC had
paid the full amounts due. Id. at 332, 335.
264. Id. at 335-36. But see First Empire Bank, 572 F.2d at 1370-71 (requiring equitable
treatment for all creditors based on pre-FIRREA legislation).
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D. Borrowers
In expanding the protection of federal deposit insurers, Congress
and the courts have barred borrowers, as successors to the failed bank,
from bringing state-law defenses against the regulators.265 The Supreme
Court originated this doctrine in 1942 in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC,266 as a modification of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.267 In
D'Oench, Duhme, the Supreme Court did not allow a borrower to en-
force a secret side agreement to a promissory note when the agreement
was designed to deceive the FDIC.268 In the side agreement, the defiinct
bank agreed not to collect under the note.269 The Court determined that
such agreements conceal the truth from bank examiners, and therefore
the borrower was estopped from asserting any defense.270
In 1950 Congress partially codified D'Oench, Duhme in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) to provide that when the FDIC acquires a loan, in its corporate
capacity, the only documents operative between the borrower and the
FDIC are written agreements executed by the bank and the obligor and
approved by the bank's board of directors, which have been in the bank's
continuous official record.271 D'Oench, Duhme and § 1823(e) have been
broadly interpreted to grant "holder in due course" 272 status to the
FDIC holder.273 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit found that "the
FDIC has a complete defense to state and common law fraud claims on a
265. Marsha Hymanson, Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823
Overprotect the Insurer When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 255 (1988).
266. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
267. The elements to establish equitable estoppel are (1) the estopped party makes false or
misleading representations by words, conduct, or silence, (2) the other party relies upon that
communication, and (3) the other party would be harmed materially if the estopped party is
later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with the earlier conduct. DAN B. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3, at 42 (1973).
268. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459-60. It is unnecessary to show actual intent by the
borrower to deceive the bank examiners. The only requirement is that the borrower partici-
pated in the act bringing about the deception. Id at 461. See generally Robert W. Norcross,
Jr., The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Com-
mon Law, 103 BANKING L.L 316 (1986) (describing modem application of the D'Oench
doctrine).
269. D'Oench, Dhume, 315 U.S. at 459-61.
270. Id. The D'Oench doctrine applies to the FDIC in both its receiver and corporate
capacities. See FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986).
271. 12 U.S.C § 1823(e) (Supp. IV 1992). For a discussion of legislative history, see
Hymanson, supra note 265, at 275-80.
272. "Holders in due course" are not subject to personal defenses that the makers of nego-
tiable instruments may have against the original holder. U.C.C. § 3-407.
273. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985);
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 873 (1 1th Cir. 1982); FDIC v. Burger, 631 F. Supp. 1141,
1144 (D. Kan. 1986); FDIC v. Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
July 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
note acquired by the FDIC . . . for value, in good faith, and without
actual knowledge of the fraud. ' 274
The most expansive modification to D'Oench, Duhme came from the
Supreme Court in 1987. In Langley v. FDIC,275 the Court granted the
FDIC super "holder in due course" status, thus eliminating lender liabil-
ity claims. The borrowers in Langley defended a collection action alleg-
ing that the notes had been procured by the bank through
misrepresentation and fraud. 276 But since the loan documents did not
refer to the bank's misrepresentations, the Supreme Court determined
that they could not be asserted as a defense against the FDIC under
§ 1823(e).277 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the word
"agreement" in § 1823(e) is not limited to an express promise to perform
an act in the future.278 Justice Scalia reiterated that the purpose of
§ 1823(e) is to allow federal and state bank examiners to rely on bank
records in evaluating a bank's assets, and so that "agreements" become
bank records contemporaneously with the making of the note, subject to
approval by the bank's board to prevent fraudulent insertion of new
terms.279 The Supreme Court further stated that FDIC knowledge of the
asserted defense at the time it acquired the note was irrelevant. 280
So, after Langley, the FDIC has super holder in due course status,
which allows it to ignore defenses about which it had prior knowledge. 281
The initial concepts of equitable estoppel espoused in D'Oench, Duhme
are sound, but the expansion of these principals granting the FDIC super
holder in due course status is unfair to innocent borrowers. The
purchase of notes and mortgages from the primary lenders gives the en-
terprises holder in due course status. D'Oench, Duhme superpowers give
the conservator an unfair advantage over innocent, victimized borrowers
and only serve to disrupt the borrowers' commercial expectations.
Every private party engaged in business with the failed banks and
thrifts risks unexpected losses due to modification of legal rights. The
banking and thrift crisis was the first federal bailout of federal instrumen-
talities in which the private parties contested government actions.
274. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873.
275. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
276. FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1986), affid, 484 U.S. 86 (1987)
277. Langley, 484 U.S. at 86.
278. Id. at 90-92.
279. Id. at 92. Justice Scalia acknowledged that fraud in fact which renders the agreement
entirely void would take the instrument out of § 1823(e). Id. at 93.
280. Id.
281. The estoppel protection of D'Oench, Duhme, § 1823(e), and the holder in due course
doctrine have been extended to private purchasers of a failed financial institution.
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Through the regulator's actions and the court's acquiescence a new stan-
dard evolved, under which the government's interests superseded those
of the private sector.
VI. Reorganization: Balancing Private and Public Interests
A. Enterprises Distinguished From Banks and Thrifts
Banks, thrifts and enterprises, as congressionally chartered,, pri-
vately owned corporations, share federal instrumentality status. The
principle difference between banks and enterprises is that federal banking
laws were created to protect depositors, while enterprises were chartered
to benefit borrowers. Accordingly, the regulatory response to the bank-
ing and thrift crisis protected the depositors, but sacrificed the institu-
tions and other private-sector interests. It created a new standard of
corporate governance in which the government's interests superseded
those of the shareholders, creditors, and borrowers.282 Federal deposit
insurance is essential to the business of banking, but it is not the only
important element in the industry. Shareholder investment is vital to
raise capital; creditors and borrowers keep the institution viable on a
daffy basis. While the depositors of a failed bank or thrift must be pro-
tected, the iron-clad retroactive grant of power to the government caused
the closure of viable institutions and prevented shareholders and credi-
tors from protecting their investments. This new standard favoring the
government disregards other vital interests and is misplaced in connec-
tion with banks and thrifts. It would also be wrong to apply it to an
enterprise.
Although not explicitly insured by the federal government, enter-
prise debts must be honored by the government because of the important
role they play in the nation's financial markets. Congress chartered en-
terprises to promote and facilitate social goals, but the enterprises have
become indispensable to the American economy because of the extraordi-
nary growth of the secondary markets. 283 Enterprises are indeed "too
big to fail." 284 Like the Latin American debt crisis, the farm credit res-
cue, and the bank and thrift debacle, the failure of an enterprise would
harm the national and international financial markets. The federal gov-
ernment would need to act quickly to support the continued operation of
enterprises.
282. See supra notes 265-281 and accompanying text.
283. The obligations of the enterprises more than doubled in the five years from 1984 to
1989. GAO, THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS, supra note 5, at 28.
284. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986).
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Congress created enterprises to protect borrowers by improving the
supply of credit. As financial intermediaries, enterprises must also pro-
tect their shareholders and creditors to fulfill their public mission of en-
hancing and stabilizing the availability of loans. Without adequate
precautions, laws granting "superpowers" to the conservators of the
failed depository institutions could be precedent for the same damaging
grant of power to the conservator of an enterprise. As financial institu-
tions, the enterprises have strong structural similarities to banks and
thrifts, and similarly do business in the private sector with shareholders,
creditors, and borrowers.
However, there are two key distinctions between enterprises and
banks or thrifts. First, policy motivations behind the bank and thrift
industry mandate closure of institutions facing economic hardship, while
different goals for the enterprises require continued operation, even in
crisis situations. Shaped by the Great Depression and the fear of a "run
on the bank," the FDIC promotes the stability of and confidence in the
nation's banking industry by supporting depositors with insurance
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States Treasury. 28 5
Thus, the regulators were obligated to protect the depositors in the bank
and thrift crisis by closing and merging the banks and thrifts, at the ex-
pense of other interests. Although the enterprises also originate from the
Great Depression, they were created to benefit borrowers by enhancing
the stability and availability of credit. In the Safety and Soundness Act
of 1992, Congress recognized that the enterprise function of providing
credit could only be advanced by sustaining the ongoing business of the
enterprises. The second distinction is that closure of banks and thrifts
would primarily affect regional markets, but the enterprise failure could
disrupt national and international markets. The banks and thrifts remain
primarily regional institutions whose operations can be absorbed by
other institutions. But since the enterprises are national financial institu-
tions that control secondary markets affecting borrowers nationally and
investors worldwide, the government would have great difficulty "resolv-
ing" a financially troubled enterprise by merging it into another
enterprise.
A government-appointed conservator of an enterprise would create
more problems than it would solve. The conservator should be accounta-
ble to the shareholders of an enterprise and should not be entitled to
priority for suits against common third-party defendants. Because enter-
prise stock offerings and debt obligations are exempt from securities laws,
285. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
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private remedies are essential to protecting the integrity of the market.
Also, the enterprises' creditors-the capital markets-provide funds for
the enterprises and are key to maintaining the nation's flow of credit.
Accordingly, the capital markets and the enterprises' borrowers should
be protected from any conservator "superpowers" because these powers
would disrupt commercial expectations within the secondary markets
and constrict the flow of credit. Thus the rights of the borrowers and
creditors must not be disregarded, even in the event of the enterprises'
insolvency. Rather, all interests of the enterprise-from the private and
the public sectors-should be balanced to achieve a viable reorganization
that would continue the enterprise's business operations, thereby preserv-
ing the availability of credit.
B. New Standard: The Best Interests of the Enterprise
The first step toward balancing the valuable interests of the private
sector with the enterprises' public mission is recognizing the best inter-
ests of the enterprise as the new standard to govern reorganization. Con-
tinuing operation, however modified, which does not unduly hinder the
flow of credit to the enterprise's targeted borrowers would be in the best
interest of the enterprise. To maintain the supply of loans to borrowers,
the interests of creditors must also be protected. Therefore, the best in-
terests of the enterprise would be served by a fair balancing between
creditors' protection and maintenance of the availability of credit to bor-
rowers. The public's interest would be served by protecting the enter-
prise's agenda to provide credit to homeowners, farmers, students, and
other disadvantaged borrowers.
Enterprises, as quasi-private corporations, were created specifically
to take advantage of private business and markets. 2 6 The traditional
corporate model of maximization of shareholder wealth is inapplicable to
the enterprises. The government supremacy standard that evolved from
the failed banks and thrifts28 7 is equally inapplicable to enterprises be-
cause it recognizes only one side of the enterprise equation-the govern-
mental interest-while disregarding the equally important private sector
interests.
Even though twenty-eight states have enacted corporate constitu-
ency statutes that enable corporate directors to consider the interests of
the corporation and the corporate community,28 8 there has yet to be sig-
286. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 763 (1824); supra
text accompanying note 114.
287. See supra notes 182-197 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
July 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
nificant case law that develops and defines these principles.2 9 The enter-
prises' corporate community, which includes shareholders, creditors,
bondholders, borrowers, employees, and the government, would be better
served with a Congressional directive stating that all rights of the private
and public sector shall be considered in the event of enterprise insol-
vency. The balancing of competing interests should be done before a
major conflict materializes. Defining rights upon a bankruptcy or other
default is one of the most important aspects of a lease, mortgage, con-
tract, and even marriage. At the time the parties enter into a lease, mort-
gage, or prenuptial agreement, each party desires a mutually satisfying
relationship. Therefore, defining rights upon a party's bankruptcy or de-
fault is done prospectively in the spirit of conciliatory good faith. So, if
the marriage falters, the tenant's roof leaks, or the borrower fails to repay
the loan, and the parties' relationship becomes adversarial, preordained
mechanisms determine the balance of competing interests.
The enterprises, as federal instrumentalities, can be considered part-
nerships between the private and public sectors. Federal statutes and
rules constitute the partnership agreement. In the Safety and Soundness
Act of 1992, Congress amended the enterprises' partnership agreements
to provide that if an enterprise falls into financial trouble, a government
conservator will be appointed. 290 Upon the appointment of the conserva-
tor, government interests supersede those of private parties. The concept
that a government-appointed conservator could fairly consider private-
sector interests in troubled times is naive and inconsistent with the les-
sons learned from the bank and thrift crisis. In the midst of a financial
crisis, the government-appointed conservator would be incapable of
fairly balancing the public and private interests. Even if Congress in-
structed the conservator to balance the interests of all parties, the conser-
vator, acting alone and with great discretion, could easily succumb to
public policy and political factors.291 Proper balancing requires the con-
sideration of all relevant factors within a structure in which the compet-
ing parties can articulate their concerns.292
Because of the complexity in defining the competing private- and
public-sector rights if an enterprise becomes insolvent, balancing the
rights of creditors while maintaining the government's interest in provid-
289. See Symposium, supra note 89; see also Carney, supra note 88.
290. See supra notes 159-172 and accompanying text.
291. For a discussion of how public policy and political factors can affect decision making,
see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and




ing credit to borrowers protects the nation's economy. The private sec-
tor should insist that Congress amend the enterprises' charter to provide
a forum for the consideration of all interests upon the insolvency of an
enterprise. This forum should allow input from the entire enterprise
community-shareholders, creditors, borrowers, and the government.
This structure is not foreign to Congress or to the private sector, as it is
the basic principle behind the Federal Bankruptcy Code.293
C. Enterprise Reorganization
A standard that considers the best interests of the enterprise in the
context of its public mission, as well as the competing interests of the
private sector, is most appropriate in a bankruptcy proceeding. Feder-
ally insured banks and thrifts are excluded from the bankruptcy code
because Congress preferred speedy resolution of the failed associations
through purchase and assumption transactions in order to protect the
stability of and public confidence in the nation's banking industry. 294
This argument against bankruptcy, however, does not apply to an enter-
prise. Reorganization of an enterprise could not occur quickly, and
bankruptcy would create no greater stigma to an enterprise than would
the appointment of a government conservator. Moreover, bondholders
and other creditors would probably prefer a bankruptcy proceeding,
which provides a forum for the creditors rather than the dictatorial gov-
ernment conservatorship used in the bank and thrift crisis.
One of the aims of bankruptcy is that creditors share losses equita-
bly to prevent a race to claim the debtor's limited assets.295 When banks
and thrifts failed, the government demanded priority over other creditors
to the assets of debtors and related third parties. If enterprises fail, their
creditors would not even be guaranteed their debt liquidation value, since
enterprises would not be liquidated immediately and would be left sub-
ject to the discretion of the government-appointed conservator. Bank-
ruptcy would protect the enterprises' assets from a race between the
creditors and the government while allowing for reorganization through
a binding debt adjustment plan.2 9 6 Further, bankruptcy provides the
293. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. supp. 1992).
294. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865, 870 (1Ith Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
295. See supra note 90; see also Alberto Ganzalo Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady:
Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 97
(1991).
296. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the reorganization and adjustment of
debts of municipalities. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1988). Municipalities include political subdivi-
sions or public agencies or instrumentalities of a state. 11 U.S.C. § 101(34). Similar to enter-
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mechanism for creditors, other private interests, and the government to
participate in the reorganization. The purpose of the bankruptcy should
be to permit debt adjustment so that the enterprise could be reorganized
without cost to the federal government. Federal assistance should be an
option, not a necessity.
The best interests of the corporation should guide the reorganization
of an enterprise. 297 If that were the case, government interests would not
be dominant or controlling. Instead, the competing interests of the
shareholders, creditors, borrowers, and government would be balanced
in the reorganization proceeding to insure the continued operation of the
enterprise and the fair allocation of sacrifice among the interested parties.
VII. Conclusion
The enterprises, as quasi-public corporations, have successfully
achieved their mission to improve and stabilize credit. The enterprises'
secondary markets, with their mortgage-backed securities and other obli-
gations, quickly found an important niche in the nation's economy. The
enterprises are clearly "too big to fail," as liquidating an enterprise would
significantly disrupt the nation's economy. The bank and thrift crisis was
a costly experience in many respects. We should learn our lessons by
rejecting the government supremacy standard and the appointment of a
conservator for financially troubled enterprises. While enterprise ties to
the government are strong, their responsibilities to shareholders, borrow-
ers, and creditors are equally important. The private sector should de-
mand that Congress carefully consider the rights of all parties upon
enterprise insolvency. Once an enterprise falls into financial trouble and
a conservator is appointed, the power will have shifted and the private
sector will have no ability to limit agency power. The private sector
should vigorously challenge regulatory power to appoint a conservator
before a problem arises.
The federal government did not create depositors, but merely sought
to protect their interests after the Great Depression. However, Congress
did create the enterprises, as partnerships between the public and private
sectors, and therefore the federal government should be responsible to
the enterprises' shareholders, creditors, and borrowers.
prises, the public nature of municipalities prevents liquidation and the purpose of
municipalities' bankruptcies are to permit financially distressed public entities to seek protec-
tion from creditors while formulating a reorganization plan. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 900.02, at 900-13 (15th ed. Nov. supp. 1991).
297. See Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991).
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